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Abstract
The use of wireless networks for communication has grown significantly in recent times,
and continues to develop further. The broadcast nature of wireless communications makes
them susceptible to a wide variety of security attacks. Unlike traditional solutions, which
usually handle security at the application layer, the primary concern of this disserta-
tion is to analyse and develop solutions for secure communication using channel coding
techniques at the physical-layer.
The topic of physical layer authenticated encryption using high rate key generation
through shared randomness is investigated in this work. First, a physical layer secret
key generation scheme is discussed exploiting channel reciprocity in wireless systems. In
order to address the susceptibility of this family of schemes to active attacks, a novel
physical layer authentication encryption protocol is presented along with its extension
to multi-node networks in the presence of active adversaries. Unlike previous work in
the area of generating secret keys through shared randomness, it is demonstrated that
the proposed scheme is semantically secure with respect to chosen plaintext and chosen
ciphertext attacks.
Secondly, in order to increase the rate in bits per seconds at which agreed crytographich
keys are been generated, a multi-level quantization algorithm with public feedback is
discussed. It is demonstrated that the proposed scheme is superior to direct information
distillation approaches and can substantially increase the key generation rates even at low
and medium SNRs. Furthermore, the employment of this low-overhead feedback at the
information distillation process can largely simplify the information reconciliation process.
The proposed secret key generation schemes are tested for randomness such as required
for cryptographic keys. The validation test is perfomed with the aid of National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical test suite. The P-values obtained in each
of the test carried out indicates that the key sequence generated by our algorithm is
i
random.
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Summary
Problem Statement:
Efficient generation of cryptographic keys at the physical in wireless communication re-
mains an important research question in the study of physical layer security. Specifically,
extracting random cryptographic keys from the physical layer with a high key agreement
probability and key bit rate in bits per seconds are conflicting goals, such that a bet-
ter performance in one is achieved at the expense of the other. Existing Physical layer
key generation schemes are susceptible to active attacks. It is thus imperative to study
on efficient key generation models which are robust to active attacks, while keeping the
complexity low..
Objectives::
• Review relevant literature in the field of physical layer security.
• Propose and implement a novel key generation algorithm which achieves a high key
agreement and key bit rate simultaneously, thus practically feasible.
• Propose and implement a novel key authentication scheme for use in physical layer
security against active attacks.
• Investigate the possibility of physical layer security in optical network.
My Solution:
• Develop a system model for the key generation process.
• Investigate on the achievable key bit rate possible with our model.
iv
• Based on the achievable rate, propose and implement appropriate error correction
codes
• Novel adaptive quantization scheme with multi-level public feedback.
• Novel physical layer authentication encryption protocol.
• Propose a key generation model for optical networks.
Contributions:
• Developed a secret key generation model for extracting secret keys from an Additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN).
• Analyzed the achievable key rate as a function of code block length and error
probability for the key generation model.
• Develped a novel adaptive quantization scheme with multi-level public feedback
achieving high with high key agreement and key generation bit rate.
• Designed a novel physical layer authentication encryption protocol for active at-
tacks.
v
CONTENTS
Abstract i
Acknowledgements iii
Summary iv
List of Figures viii
List of Tables xiv
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Physical layer security at a glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 BACKGROUND STUDY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 8
2.1 Shannon’s Cipher and Perfect secrecy Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Wiretap Channel Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Common randomness, secret key agreement and information theory . . . . 17
vi
CONTENTS
2.4 Security issues in wireless networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1 Security attacks in wireless network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Physical layer security in wireless network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.1 Physical layer security exploiting channel randomness . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.2 Channel Randomness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.3 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.4 Key Generation Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 SECRET KEY GENERATION 37
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 System model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.1 Channel Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.2 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.3 Channel Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.4 Achievable Key Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Secret Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.1 Advantage Distillation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.2 Information Reconciliation Phase Using FEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.3 Privacy Amplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Improving the Key Generation Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.1 Information Distillation with Guard band (GB) . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.2 Quantizer with Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4 ENHANCED KEY GENERATION and PHYSICAL LAYER AUTHEN-
TICATION ENCRYPTION 70
4.1 Quantizer with Public Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1.1 SA− SD(0) : Hard decision (same slot) . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1.2 SA− SD(1) : Soft decision ±1 slot indices: . . . . . . . . . . 81
vii
CONTENTS
4.1.3 SA− SD(2) : Soft decision ±2 slot indices: . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.1.4 Secret Key Bit Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.1.5 Probability of Error at the Information Distillation Process . . . . . 103
4.1.6 Information Reconciliation Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1.7 FEC Code Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2 Physical Layer Authenticated Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2.1 Two Node PLAE Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2.2 Multi-node Key Generation Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3 Validation of the Key Generation Protocol Through the NIST Test . . . . 113
5 CONCLUSION 116
5.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.2 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Glossary 119
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Illustration of an adversary eavesdropping information in wireless commu-
nication network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 The wiretap channel model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 The Gaussian wiretap channel model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Concept of Multipath Fading[1]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 Wireless system model [2]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Threat Model [3][4]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 Gaussian fit to the histogram of ∆θA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Gaussian fit to the histogram of ∆θB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5 Numerical evaluation of σ2t using 10
5 independent realizations of the chan-
nel coefficients x0 and y0 as a function of the channel SNR. . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6 Achievable phase secret key rates in the finite blocklength regime. . . . . . 50
3.7 Blocklength n required to achieve desired fractional rate η = R
(φ)
k /C
(φ)
k as
a function of the error rate  for various SNRs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.8 Information reconciliation rate (IRR) for the quantizer without feedback. . 52
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
3.9 Information reconciliation rate (IRR) for the quantizer without feedback. . 54
3.10 Information reconciliation rate (IRR) for the adaptive quantizer without
feedback. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.11 Example of quantization levels for 6σt =
pi
4
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.12 Secret Key Generation Flow Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.13 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=2 59
3.14 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=4 59
3.15 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=8 60
3.16 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=16 60
3.17 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=32 61
3.18 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=64 61
3.19 IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=2 . . . . . . . . . 62
3.20 IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=8 . . . . . . . . . 62
3.21 IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=8 . . . . . . . . . 63
3.22 IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=16 . . . . . . . . . 63
3.23 IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=32 . . . . . . . . . 64
3.24 IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=64 . . . . . . . . . 64
3.25 Percentage Key Agreement vs SNR for Plain Quantizer with Redundancy . 66
3.26 Plain Quantizer vs Quantizer with Redundancy ; Percentage Key Agree-
ment vs SNR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.27 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.28 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.29 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
x
LIST OF FIGURES
3.30 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.31 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.32 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1 Proposed quantizer with public feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 2, SA− SD(0). . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 4, SA− SD(0). . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 8, SA− SD(0). . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 16, SA− SD(0). . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 32, SA− SD(0). . . . . . . . . . 75
4.7 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 64 , SA− SD(0). . . . . . . . . . 76
4.8 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(0), IRR as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.9 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(0), IDR as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.10 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(0), Key length at the output of the quantizer
as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.11 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n , Q = 2, SA− SD(0) . . 79
4.12 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n Q = 4, SA− SD(0) . . 79
4.13 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n , Q = 8, SA− SD(0) . 80
4.14 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n Q = 16, SA− SD(0) . . 80
4.15 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n Q = 32, SA− SD(0) . . . 81
4.16 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n Q = 64, SA− SD(0) . . 81
4.17 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 2 , SA− SD(1). . . . . . . . . . 83
4.18 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 4 , SA− SD(1). . . . . . . . . . 83
4.19 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 8 , SA− SD(1). . . . . . . . . . 84
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
4.20 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 16 , SA− SD(1). . . . . . . . . . 84
4.21 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 32 , SA− SD(1). . . . . . . . . . 85
4.22 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 64 , SA− SD(1). . . . . . . . . . 85
4.23 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(1), IRR as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.24 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(1), IDR as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.25 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(1), Key length at the output of the quantizer
as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.26 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 2, SA− SD(1) . . . 88
4.27 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 4, SA− SD(1) . . . 88
4.28 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 8, SA− SD(1) . . . 89
4.29 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 16, SA− SD(1) . . 89
4.30 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 32, SA− SD(1) . . 90
4.31 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 64, SA− SD(1) . . 90
4.32 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 2 , SA− SD(2). . . . . . . . . . 92
4.33 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 4 , SA− SD(2). . . . . . . . . . 93
4.34 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 8 , SA− SD(2). . . . . . . . . . 93
4.35 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 16 , SA− SD(2). . . . . . . . . . 94
4.36 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 32 , SA− SD(2). . . . . . . . . . 94
4.37 IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 64 , SA− SD(2). . . . . . . . . . 95
4.38 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(2), IRR as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.39 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(2), IDR as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.40 Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(2), Key length at the output of the quantizer
as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.41 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 2, SA− SD(2) . . . 98
4.42 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 4, SA− SD(2) . . . 98
4.43 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 8, SA− SD(2) . . . 99
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
4.44 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 16, SA− SD(2) . . 99
4.45 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 32, SA− SD(2) . . 100
4.46 IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 64, SA− SD(2) . . 100
4.47 Performance of Same Slot Position ,±1 Adjacent Slot Position and ±2
Adjacent Slot Position (a) Key Agreement vs SNR (b) Used Channel Phase
Samples vs SNR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.48 Secret Key Bit Rate as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.49 Secret Key Bit Rate as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.50 Secret Key Bit Rate as a function of SNR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.51 Information reconciliation rate (IRR) in the SA− SD(0) approach. . . . . 105
4.52 Information reconciliation rate (IRR) in the SA− SD(1) approach. . . . . 106
4.53 Information reconciliation rate (IRR) in the SA− SD(2) approach. . . . . 106
4.54 Required k
n
to achieve a target IRR for Q = 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.55 Required k
n
to achieve a target IRR for Q = 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.56 Required k
n
to achieve a target IRR for Q = 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.57 Required k
n
to achieve a target IRR for Q = 16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
xiii
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Summary of existing secret key extraction using RSS. . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 NIST statistical randomness test result for a 1e7 bits stream, for SA −
SD(2), SNR = 30 dB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
xiv
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The advent of wireless communication has changed the manner by which we commu-
nicate and access information. Over the years there has been a revolution in wireless
communication technologies fuelled by the increasing demands for a anytime-anywhere
communication access by public consumers, military and scientific applications. Technol-
ogy like radio frequency identification have been develop to aid in inventory monitoring
and supply chain management. For scientific applications, sensor networks have been de-
veloped to monitor,detect events and collect data of environmental conditions(e.g. earth
quake, climate and weather change) and infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, rails)[5].
Technologies like wireless local area network(WLAN), bluetooth and cellular networks
have been increased deployed in public location allowing consumers to have access to the
internet[6]. An important type of wireless communication technologies is the mobile ad-
hoc networks (MANETs) and mesh style networks, which an increased bandwidth and
data rate at a low cost of deployment due to the use of affordable wireless hardware (e.g
802.11)[7]. These ad-hoc networks are becoming an attractive alternative to the conven-
1
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tional cellular networks. Advances in wireless Technology like Smart(Cognitive) Radio
Networks allows a wireless device which is highly programmable to adjust its protocols
and communication interface so as to adjust to opportunities that can improve the user’s
overall communication experience.
In spite of the development in these emerging wireless technologies, their successfully
deployment has been plagued with issues of security. The broadcast nature of wireless
communication links makes them susceptible to security attacks. For example, wireless
communication channel are open to channel jamming from a attacker who intends to pre-
vent legitimate users from having access to the network. Also an adversary can attack a
communication system without proper authentication security mechanism, so as to gain
unauthorized entry and access to the network resource, thus bypassing all security infras-
tructure. Lastly, an eavesdropper can exploit the broadcast nature of wireless channel
to steal user transmitted information without resulting to advanced technological tools[8]
[9].
Given our increased dependency on wireless communication services, a loss in the secu-
rity of user information transmitted over the internet can have grave impact on the society.
United States (US) national security agency (NSA) director, General Keith Alexander
called cybercrimes the greatest transfer of wealth in history. It has been reported that
the estimated global cost of cybercrimes annually exceed $385 billion. Cybercrimes cost
the US roughly $100 billion loss yearly. Within the United Kingdom, the national audit
office estimates a $30 billion loss to cybercrime annually[10]. Given that security is a crit-
ical issue in wireless communication applications, it is imperative that user information
transmitted over wireless communication link be secured so as not to be eavesdropped by
an adversary.
2
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1.1 Physical layer security at a glance
In virtually all wireless communication technologies, security issues have been handled
at the upper layer of the protocol stack using variations of private and public keys cryp-
tography often referred to as computational security. This uses practical cryptographic
approaches which are built to achieve semantic security, i.e., to withstand polynomial
time chosen plaintext attacks. Such schemes really on the (unproven) intractability of
certain hard problems typically involving the use of large prime numbers [11] [12]. For
such scheme to work the existence of a shared source of entropy that can be accessed by
the legitimate communicating node and inaccessible by an attacker is required and the
entropy of this source should be sufficient to support computational complexity proof. In
protocols in which the keys are used only once, this source of randomness is necessary for
continuous update of the symmetric key. On the other hand if the keys are used multiple
times, this source of randomness is used to update complementary parameters, such as
initialization vectors (IVs), nonces of the particular enciphering scheme used. Despite
the success of computationally security, their use is limited in some emerging wireless
network architectures. As an example, the distribution of secret keys between legitimate
communicating node in a wireless network requires some infrastructures for it to be car-
ried it out. A solution to this is the use of a public key infrastructure (PKI) mechanism
(e.g Diffie Hellman) in the presence of a certificate authority (CA), however in a dynamic
mobile environment, it difficult and impractical to ensure the availability of a CA [13][14].
It is therefore imperative to have other alternatives for establishing secret key for secure
wireless communication without resulting to a fixed infrastructure.
It has been shown from result in information theory and signal processing that the
imperfections of wireless communication channel can be exploited to provide sure com-
munication over it. As an example, noise and fading have been considered as impairment
to prevent reliable communication, however information theoretic results shows that the
3
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can be used to conceal user information from an adversary. Phsycal layer security is
encompasses all study of channel models and algorithms which exploits the properties of
the channel fortify the security of the communication system [15] [16][17].
In order to illustrate the concept of physical layer security, consider a transmitter, re-
ceiver and adversary node as shown in Fig.1.1. The wireless link between the transmitter
and receiver is called the main channel, which the wireless link between the transmit-
ter and the adversary is called the adversary channel. According to communication
theory[18], an adversary located at least half the wavelength of transmitted signal from
the receiver, observes an output which is different and statistically independent from that
observed by the receiver. This discrepancy in the observed output by the receiver and ad-
versary is caused by physical phenomena namely: wirelesschannelfading and pathloss.
This is studied in detail in Chapter 2.
Main Channel 
Transmitter 
Receiver 
Adversary 
Figure 1.1: Illustration of an adversary eavesdropping information in wireless communi-
cation network.
In summary, physical layer security offer some level of information theoretic security,
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which requires the transmitter and receiver to have an advantage over the adversary. It
is important to note that physical layer security does not replace computational security,
rather fortifies the existing cryptographic technique by the addition of an extra layer of
security at the physical layer.
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we present innovative approaches and novel results in physical layer security
using information theoretic principles.
Instead of extracting cyrtographic keys from the recieved signal strenght(RSS) such
as in [19][20][21][22][23][24] we use the phase of the local channel state information(CSI)
estimates for information distillation. The primary motivation behind this is that using
the CSI phase ensures that the generated keys are uniform while we show that the esti-
mation error is approximately Gaussian. This is favoured by the current state of art in
signal processing which allows very high resolution in phase estimation, and as a result
high key generation rates are attainable. Following this approach the estimation error
is shown to be approximately Gaussian while the phase estimates at the adversary are
uncorrelated to those at the legitimate nodes.
Two weaknesses associated with the existing key generation schemes are:
• If the probe signal used during the channel estimation phase is jammed, a low SNR
will be experienced. In this regards, it is imprtant to develop a system whichis
robust to low SNR it its operation[25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33].
• Existing key generation schemes thrives on the wings of the use of feedback. How-
ever, this feedback is susceptible to jamming and interception, as a result a scheme
which is robust to attacks from an active adversary should be investigated.
In this thesis, we address the above issues as follows:
5
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• The first issue is handled by the proposed novel adaptive quantization scheme with
multi-level public feedback, which acts as an interface between the advantage distil-
lation and the information reconciliation phases. The proposed quantizer achieves
a particularly high information distillation rate at the two legitimate nodes (more
than 90%) and allows a substantial reduction in the complexity of the reconcilia-
tion process. The latter is implemented using very low complexity forward error
correction (FEC) codes across all signal to noise ratio (SNR) regions.
• The second issue is handled by our proposed novel physical layer authenticated
encryption protocol which takes care of the active adversaries. The complexity of
the proposed scheme is minimal in comparison to public key encryption schemes,
rendering it a compelling approach for establishing secure links in ad-hoc networks
and device-to-device communications.
1.3 Outline
Chapter 2 presents a background study on information theoretic principles related to and
used in the following chapters. It begin by introducing Shannon’s cipher and perfect
secrecy channel model. The next section summarized specific result from the Wyner
wiretap channel model which were founded upon the observation that Shannon’s noiseless
model is unnecessarily restrictive. A detailed study of the security issues in wireless
networks, and a literature review on existing physical layer security techniques for secure
wireless communication is discussed.
In Chapter 3, we introduced our system model discussing the channel and adver-
sary model. Our key generation algorithm and quantization approach is presented. We
proposed the use of gaurdbands for improving the performance of the information recon-
ciliation rate. Simulations results in this section shows the effect of the guardband size on
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the information reconciliation (IRR) and information distillation rates (IDR). Next, we
propose the use of redundant bits in improving the IRR and IDR. This results is applied
to the simple quantizer and quantizer with gaurdbands.
In Chapter 4, an improved adaptive quantizer using a multi-level public feedback which
acts an interface between the advantage distillation and information reconciliation phases
is proposed. A low complexity forward error correction code is discussed for reconciling the
discrepancies in the key sequence generated by Alice and Bob. We propose a novel physical
layer authentication encryption method in the next section, while the final section discus
a test which verifies the randomness of the generated key sequence using the national
institute of standards and technology (NIST) statistical test suite.
Finally Chapter 5, concludes our work and present an outline for feature research
work. The result in this dissertation have been submitted to the IEEE conference on
communication and network security.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND STUDY AND
LITERATURE REVIEW
Recently, a fundamental different approach to security has emerge from the area of in-
formation theory under the generic term physical layer security (PLS). PLS encompasses
all keyless security technologies that can ensure perfect secrecy by exploiting a source of
entropy typically considered a foe rather than a friend, that is, the noise and interference
in real communication media. PLS was pioneered by Wyner and was founded upon the
observation of Shannon noiseless model. We can say that in all realistic communication
settings between a source node (commonly denoted as “Alice”) and an intended destina-
tion node (commonly referred as “Bob”), the observation of Bob and and an adversary
(commonly donated as “Eve”) are different realizations of a joint probability distribu-
tion(the output of the channel transmission).
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2.1 Shannon’s Cipher and Perfect secrecy Channel
In the design of any communication system two fundamental requirements are taken into
consideration: (i) reliability in the exchange of information between Alice and Bob, and
(ii) security in terms of confidentiality and message integrity with respect to an adversary
Eve. These two aspects in the design of any actual communication system have been
traditionally a dressed separately . The reason behind this is traced back to the decisive
difference in the set up of the elementary models first proposed by Claude Shannon for
investigating the two issues. In terms of reliability, a noisy channel was assumed to
connect the source node (“Alice”) and destination node (“Bob”). On the other hand, if
confidentiality is considered, then a noiseless and error free channel is assumed to link
Alice, Bob and Eve. However in real scenarios, the system is not perfectly error free
due to the existence of some form of noise. The assumption of an error free channel will
thus correspond to the existence of powerful error correction system which ensure that
Bob recovers the transmitted message with an arbitrary small error probability. Shannon
proved that unconditional security can be achieved only with the use of perfect secrecy
keys.
At this point, it is important to introduce and explain the concept of entropy of random
processes. Consider two random processes M and C.
• Let Fn = {(c0, . . . , cn−1)|ci ∈ {0, 1}}, i.e a vector space of length n-bits. If the
message M transmitted by Alice is modelled as a random process, and C is the
message received by Bob. Then I(M ;C) is a measure of uncertainty ,i.e the amount
of information about M recovered by Bob due to the observation of C. Shannon
stated that for reliable communication to be possible , I(M ;C) should be large as
possible.
• If M ∈R Fn, that is, if message M is randomly drawn from a message space Fn,
9
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and C is the corresponding codeword. The mutual information between M and C
measures the uncertainty or the amount of information of the message M intercepted
by the adversary Eve given the codeword C. If the mutual information is zero then
H(M) = H(M |Y ), where H(M |Y ) is called the adversaries equivocation. This
implies that, the entropy of the message M remains unchanged regardless of the
codeword C observed by the adversary. This is an ideal case for confidentiality in a
communication system.
Alice using an encoder function and a shared random key K of which Eve has no
knowledge, maps her message signalM to codewords C using . The same key is required by
Bob upon reception of C to decodes it into the M . Alice and Bob are said to communicate
with perfect secrecy, if the message M is statistically independent of the codeword C
intercepted by the adversary Eve. We can rephrase this by saying perfect secrecy is
achieved if the mutual information of the message M and received codeword zero, thus the
codeword which is transmitted in the clear reveals no useful information about the message
M to the adversary. The absence of any correlation between M and C ensures that there
is no algorithm that would allow the adversary to extract any useful information about
M from C. This property ensures that the adversary’s best attack to recover M from
C is to guess it values. For a message of length k uniformly distributed, the probability
of the adversary successfully guessing the M given C is 2−k which is negligible for long
message length.
Shannon’s perfect secrecy is great, however it comes at a price that perfect secrecy can
only be achieved when the uncertainty or entropy about the key H(K) must be at least
as large as the uncertainty or entropy of the message H(M). This implies that the length
of the shared secret key must be as long or greater than the length of the transmitted
message [34].
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H(K) ≥ H(M) (2.1)
Shannon showed that perfect secrecy could be achieved using a simple procedure called one
time pad (OTP). Assuming M and K take on binary values, C is formed by performing
a XOR operation on each message using separate keys i.e C = M ⊕ K. Since Bob
has knowledge of K , he can easily recover M from C using M = C ⊕ K so as long
as K is uniformly distributed and statistically independent. It can be deduced that
the corresponding codewords are statistically independent of the message sent by Alice.
Since Eve has no knowledge of K, each M sent by Alice intercepted by Eve is of equal
probability, thus she is left with the choice of guessing which message was sent. The
encryption key K serves a dual purpose: (1) Randomize the codeword, (2) Ensure that
each codeword observed by Eve has the same probability. Some limitations of the OTP
are listed below,
• Alice and Bob are required to generate and store long random binary keys.
• Encryption key can only be used once.
• A secure channel must be Available to share the key.
2.2 Wiretap Channel Model
Wyner in [35] ushered in a new dispensation of information theoretic security, introducing
the famous wiretap channel model in which the adversary (also known as the wiretaper)
channel is a degraded version of the main channel. As initially introduced by wyner,
the wiretap model consists of a transmitter (Alice) wanting to communicate a message
M securely at a rate R with a legitimate receiver (Bob) in the presence of an adversary
(Eve) as shown in Fig. ,,,. Alice, the transmitter first encodes its message M which is
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a random variables M ∈ M = {1; 2nR} into codewords, Cn ∈ Cn, of length n using an
encoder fn(.) : M → Cn. The encoding of M is done with the aid of another random
variable M1 ∈
{
1; 2nR1
}
. The codeword is transmitted over a noisy broadcast channel
which has a transition probability PS,Z|C (s, z|c). It is important to note that the channel
is memoryless, thus the transition probability of a sequence of n symbols is given as,
P (sn, zn|cn) =
n∏
i=1
PS,Z|C (si, zi|ci) (2.2)
Bob the legitimate receiver observes the codeword Sn ∈ Sn, while the adversaries obser-
𝑀1 
𝑀 Encoder 
Alice 
𝐶𝑛 
𝑃𝑆 𝑍|𝐶  
Decoder 𝑆
𝑛 𝑀  
𝑍𝑛 
Bob 
Eve 
Figure 2.1: The wiretap channel model.
vation of the transmitted codeword is Zn ∈ Zn. Bob attempts to recover the transmitted
message M using a decoder function g(.) : Sn → M. He derives an estimate of M as
Mˆ = g(Cn). The adversary upon observing Zn should not obtain any useful information
about M . Where M, C, S and Z are the message source, channel input,main channel
output and adversary channel output alphabets respectively. Below, we sumarize the
important features iof the wiretap channel model,
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• Unlike Shannon noiseless channel model, the wiretap channel model considers the
presence of noise in the channel.
• The channel state information and the wiretap code are publicly known by the
transmitter, receiver and adversary.
• The wiretap model does not require a pre-shared secret key for secure communication
between the legitimate nodes. However, the wiretap model does use a random
number generator M1 in transmitter encoder to randomize the encoded message.
Unlike Shannon model, the M1 is known to the transmitter alone.
• Lastly, the wiretap channel model assumes the availability of authenticated channel,
thus considering only the problem of confidentiality. This assumption is not too re-
strictive if there exist a shared short key between the legitimate node to authenticate
the first transmission cycle with the aid of an unconditionally secure authentication
scheme. subsequent authentication of message after the first cycle is achieved using
a fraction of the previous message rate.
Having known that the goal of a transmitter is to deliver the message M reliable to
the intended receiver, while ensuring that the adversary obtains no information about it.
The uncertainty of the adversary about the message M is called the equivocation rate,
which is given as,
Re =
1
n
H(M |Zn) (2.3)
From the above equation, H(M |Zn) entails the remaining entropy of the message given
that Zn is known by the adversary. This measure the secrecy of the message M with
respect the adversary. For  > 0 and sufficiently large n, the condition for secrecy is given
as,
1
n
H(M |Zn) ≥ Re −  (2.4)
13
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND STUDY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
It should be noted that the difference in the information rate and the equivocation rate
denotes the amount of information leaked to the adversary. Thus for perfect secrecy to be
achieved, the equivocation rate Re should be arbitrarily close to the information rate R.
Consider Rs to be the information rate at which perfect secrecy is achieved, we can thus
say that a perfect secrecy rate is achievable if there exist a code such that Re ≥ Rs − 
and Pe ≤  for any  > 0, where Pe is the average error probability which will be explain
in the next [36, 37].
On the other hand, the condition for reliable communication for same large n is given
as,
P (M 6= Mˆ) (2.5)
This is the average error probability and is used as a measure of the reliability of the
communication between the transmitter and receiver. The reliability condition for the
legitimate receiver calls for the use of redundancy in the encoder to mitigate the effect
of noise in the channel, while the secrecy condition for the adversary attempts to limit
such redundancy so as to avoid avoid leakage eo information. The reliability and secrecy
condition which tends to be conflicting goals can sometimes be satisfied simultaneously.
We can thus characterize the secrecy capacity, which is the supremum of all achievable
rate possible with the wire tap code. The set of all achievable rate R,R1 and Re is given
as [38],
⋃
U→V→C→SZ

0 ≤ Re ≤ R1
Re ≤ I(V ;S|U)− I(V ;Z|U)
R1 +R ≤ I(V ;S|U) + min(I(U ;S), I(U ;Z))
0 ≤ R0 ≤ min(I(U ;S), I(U ;Z)
(2.6)
In essence, the secrecy capacity is a counterpart to the channel capacity with a secrecy
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condition imposed. The secrecy capacity is given as,
Cs = max
V→C→S→Z
(I(V ;S)− I(V ;Z)) (2.7)
From the above, we interpret the secrecy capacity as the difference between the rate of
reliable communication I(V ;S) between the transmitter and receiver to the rate at which
information is leaked to the adversary I(V ;Z). We can make important conclusions from
(2.7) as follows.
• The secrecy capacity of a channel can only be positive as long as I(V ;S)− I(V ;Z)
. This means if the adversaries has the same channel output observation as the
legitimate receiver, S = Z, then the secrecy capacity is zero. This is the case when
the main channel and adversary channel are both noiseless. This explains why
information theoretic security is not possible within the context of conventional
cryptography.
• Secondly using (2.7), we can compute the secrecy capacity of any discrete memory-
less channel. this also extends to continuous memoryless channels.
An important class of channel which is of great importance to this work is the Gaussian
wiretap channel shown in Fig.2.2. In this Gaussian channel model, the main channel
denoted by HB and adversary channel denoted by HE are modelled as additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. HB and HE are quasi static channel, thus their channel
state information are fixed during the transmission of a codeword but independent from
codeword to codeword.
Message signal M are impaired by Gaussian noises NB and NE which are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) having variance σ2B and σ
2
E respectively. The message
signal received by the legitimate receiver and the adversary is determined as,
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Figure 2.2: The Gaussian wiretap channel model.
S = HBC +NB, (2.8)
Z = HEC +NE. (2.9)
Finally, it is assumed that codeword transmitted over the channels follows the average
power constraint requirement which is given as,
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
{
C2i
} ≤ P (2.10)
The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap model is given as
Cs =

1
2
log2(1 +
H2BP
σ2B
)− 1
2
log2(1 +
H2EP
σ2E
) if
H2BP
σ2B
>
H2EP
σ2E
,
0 otherwise.
(2.11)
16
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND STUDY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.3 Common randomness, secret key agreement and
information theory
The common randomness shared by a transmitter and receiver is of great importance in
information theory and cryptography. In cryptography, common randomness serves as the
shared key used for secure communication between the transmitter and receiver. However
the key(common randomness) should be such that an adversary has no knowledge about
it. The aim of secret key agreement in is to distil secret keys from the shared common
randomness through a public discussion. Two type of model are usually considered when
a shared secret key is to be generated exploiting the common randomness.
• Source-type model: In this model, two terminals X and Y obverse the outputs of a
source of randomness which is correlated, however has no control on the source. An
example of this is a discrete memoryless multiple source which has two component
sources X,Y . Terminal X observes the source output Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn), while
terminal Y observes Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn).
• Channel-type model: In this model, terminal X transmits Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) to
terminal Y through a discrete memoryless channel. Terminal Y observes Y n =
(Y1, . . . , Yn) at the output of the discrete memoryless channel.
In both models, a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity is available for communi-
cation between terminal X and Y . Also, all communication over this channel is visible to
the adversary. The channel model is somewhat similar to the wiretap model, except that
a memoryless broadcast channel which is used only for randomness sharing, while other
communications are done over the noiseless channel of unlimited capacity. In this thesis,
we will be restricting ourselves to the channel-type model.
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2.4 Security issues in wireless networks
In wireless communication, the transmission medium has two important characteristic,
namely, Broadcast and superposition. These features pose a challenge to achieving a
reliable and secure communication between a transmitter and receiver in the presence
of an adversary. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, shielding of the
transmitted signal from an unintended receiver is a difficult task, thus making the channel
vulnerable to eavesdropping , message modification, node impersonation and other kinds
of attacks. We explain some important features of secure wireless network below[39, 40].
• Integrity: This stand for the soundness of the message data arriving the destination
nodes. Secure and reliable transmission requires that the message received by the
legitimate note should have not been tampered or alter in any form by an adversary.
Thus the message data sent over the wireless channel should maintain their integrity
even when an adversary has the tries to intercept and modifies it.
• Confidentiality: This requires that the privacy of the transmitted message data be
maintain even in the presence of an eavesdropper. Unauthorized nodes should not
have access to the message transmitted
• Availability: This property requires that the network should be absolutely functional
under any circumstance when its service is required by the legitimate nodes. To
this end, the system should not be subceptible to any form of attack posed by the
adversary when the legitimate nodes are communication over the system.
• Authentication: This requires that only legitimate nodes are able to communicate
with each other and that they do not communicate with illegitimate nodes, therefore
maintaining the confidentiality of the system. In essence authentication ensures that
all nodes which attempt to communicate legitimate nodes, thus verifying the identity
of the nodes.
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2.4.1 Security attacks in wireless network
The discussion of attacks in wireless network is often organised into passive and active
attacks. In the former, the attacker rest unnoticed in the background while carrying out
his attack. He does not disrupt the normal operation and functionality of the routing
protocol of the network, unlike the active attacker. The properties of these two attacks
are detailed below[41].
2.4.1.1 Passive attack
In passive attack, an adversary silently steals data exchanged over the wireless network
without the operation of communication. We summarize a passive attacker below
• Eavesdropping: An adversary intercepts and reads message and conversation which
where intended for a legitimate receiver.
• Traffic Analysis: An adversary who cannot eavesdrop and read the communication
between two nodes can still gain routing information with which he can determine
the location and identities of the communicating parties by analysing the commu-
nication pattern.
• Node Impersonation and routing attack: The nature of this attack is such that, an
adversary attempts to camouflage itself to be an idle node in the wireless network
so as to deceive the legitimate node into thinking that it is another legitimate node,
thus he is able to steal valuable information transmitted over the network.
2.4.1.2 Active attack
In this type of attack, the adversary actively attempts to disrupt the normal operation of
the network. We summarize the goals of an active attacker below.
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• Denial of service attack: Denial of service can either be as a result of a network
failure or a malicious adversary trying the disrupt communication. The classical
way of carrying this attack is jamming of signals and battery exhaustion. The threat
is severe if the adversary has enough computing power and bandwidth, as he will
generate a signal strong enough to overwhelm the targeted signal and interrupting
communication.
• Attack against routing: In this attack, the adversary intercepts a routing packet,
modifies its content and transmits it back into the network. The attacker can
also choose to transmit the original packet intercepted but at different time, thus
sending outdated routing information to the legitimate nodes. The purpose of these
attacks is deceive the routine nodes with conflicting informations, delaying packets
or preventing them from reach their destination node. It is therefore apparent that
an active attacker can subvert the integrity of the routing protocol by modifying it,
therefore fabricating false routing information which is sent back to the nodes. To
carry out these attacks, the adversary must be able to intercept and inject packet
into the network.
2.5 Physical layer security in wireless network
Conventional way of security in wireless networks involves the use of secure protocols at
the higher layer (application layer) which are based on cryptographic algorithms and a
shared key, to scramble the transmitted data between a pair of communicating nodes.
Cryptographic algorithms used in wireless communication are based on the argument
that it is computationally infeasible to decipher scrambled data without knowledge of the
shared key. These cryptographic algorithms require a key establishment(Key generation
and agreement) between two users in a secure manner. An important aspect of security in
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wireless communication is the distribution of the secret key between the communication
nodes. A traditional solution employs public key infrastructure (PKI ) mechanism for
the key exchange in the presence of a certification authority (CA) . An example of such
PKI is Diffie Hellman (D-H) algorithm, which is used to derive symmetric keys over
an unsecured channel. PKI mechanism algorithm are only computationally secure and
requires a high computationally complexity. For example, the D-H algorithm requires fast
exponentiation, which can be a difficult operation for mobile devices. Also, the need of a
CA further makes these solutions impracticable in some scenarios, such as sensor and Ad
Hoc networks.
2.5.1 Physical layer security exploiting channel randomness
Wireless channels are usually modelled as multipath fading channel. Multipath fading
channel are such that a transmitted signal over the channel propagates through the wire-
less channel experiencing reflection, diffraction and scattering from objects between and
around the transceiver, arriving at the receiver via several paths. The signal at the receiver
is a summation of the signals from the multiple paths which have different amplitude and
delays. Thus the multipath fading channel can be modelled as a combination of different
channel impulses each having different amplitude and delay. The concept of multipath
fading is shown in figure 2.3.
Due to relative movement of the communicating nodes and that of the reflecting clus-
ters, the paths change randomly causing the channel to vary with time thus producing
random fluctuation in the phase and amplitude of the received signal. The channel re-
sponse at any given instant is expressed as
h(t,τ) =
L−1∑
l=0
hl(t)δ(τ − τl) (2.12)
Where L is the length of the channel (channel taps), hl and τl is the complex channel gain
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Figure 2.3: Concept of Multipath Fading[1].
and delay of the (l + 1)th channel tap at a time t respectively, andδ is the unit impulse
function. The random variation of the channel properties due to the multipath fading
gives rise to four properties which are considered the foundation of physical layer security
in wireless communication[42].
2.5.2 Channel Randomness
The fading of the channel is random along time due spatial selectivity of the multipath
propagation. The channel state is also random over frequency due to the frequency
selectivity of the multipath channel.
• Temporal Variation: Here the channel fading varies randomly with time due
multipath propagation which arises from the mobility of the communicating nodes
and objects in the environment near the nodes. An important parameter to consider
is the coherence time. The coherence time is a statistical measure of the time
duration over which the impulse response of the channel is static. It is also employed
to measure the similarity of the impulse response of the channel at different times.
Due to multipath propagation, the channel fading measured at several time instants
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is random and independent of each other if the interval between the measurement
times instant is greater than the coherence time of the channel.
• Frequency Selectivity: In a multipath propagation, each possible path is affected
by different attenuation and delay and that the received signal is a combination off
all signal paths by wave interference. A variation in the carrier frequency (phase)
of the transmitted signal results in a random variation of the signal strength even
when the signal path are unchanged. Considering equation 2.12[43],
hl(t) = αl exp
jφl
h(τ) =
L∑
l
αl exp
jφl δ(τ − τl) (2.13)
Where αl is the amplitude for the L signal path. φl and τl are the phase shift and
delay respectively, which are random variable on each impulse δ. Depending on the
phase shift (frequency shift), the interference effect leads to signal amplification or
cancellation [43].
• Spatial Variation: A major security parameter which is based on the well-known
Jakes uniform scattering model is the coherence length of the channel, which is the
distance after which the channel correlation goes to zero. Stating from jakes model,
A received signal rapidly decorrelates over a distance roughly half a wavelength and
a spatial separation of one two wavelength is sufficient for assuming independent
fading channel paths. This implies that, a node (EVE) which is at least half a wave-
length from two other communicating network nodes (ALICE and BOB) experiences
a channel fading which statistically independent of the fading channel between the
two communication node (ALICE and BOB). Thus the properties of a wireless chan-
nel are unique to the locations of the two communicating nodes (ALICE and BOB)
[31].
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• Channel Reciprocity: Two nodes communicating within the coherence time of a
channel experiences the same channel fading. Thus the multipath properties of the
wireless channel are identical in both direction of the channel link. The principle of
channel reciprocity plays a key role in key establishment in physical layer security
[44].
2.5.3 Threat Model
The attack model for a wireless communication system consisting of three nodes is pre-
sented in this subsection. Where, Alice and Bob are legitimate nodes who will like to
communicate securely. Eve is a potential eavesdropper. Alice has a transmitter with NT
antennas which transmits data to Bob with NR antennas in the presence of the adversary
Eve with NE antennas. The adversary model for the physical layer security schemes is
summarized below.
• A passive adversary, Eve, can listen to all communication between the Alice and
Bob. This is due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel.
• Eve’s aim is to derive the shared secret key between Alice and Bob, and not to
disrupt the key establishment procedure by jamming the communication between
the legitimate nodes. Eve cannot modify information transmitted over the wireless
channel by Alice and Bob[45].
• Eve can measure the channel property between herself and the two communicating
nodes (Alice and Bob). Eve obtains information on the channel between her and the
legitimate nodes by exploiting the channel estimation procedure carried out by Alice
and Bob. In order to exploit the common randomness offered by the time/frequency
variant fading channel between the two nodes and the multiplexing gain provided
by the use of multiple antennas for key establishment, the legit nodes must estimate
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channel between them. The channel estimation involves Alice sending probe signal
from each of her NT to each of Bobs NR antennas respectively, vice versa. Using
the probe signal, they both estimate their channel. It is important to note that Eve
is capable of eavesdropping the probe signals exchanged between Alice and Bob, so
as to estimate the channel between her and the legit nodes[46].
• Eve is free to place intermediate objects between the two parties to affect their
channel, thus allowing her to derive some pattern only known to her. This is a
common attack system where the secret key is extracted from the received strength
of the signal. When the two legit communicating nodes are immobile, the wireless
channel between them is relatively stable. The adversary Eve, can employ predeter-
mine movement pattern thus creating a desire and predictable change in the channel
measurement between the two nodes. In practice, this occurs when Eve blocks the
line of sight between Alice and Bob by crossing the link between them, causing
the transmitted signal between them to experience sharp attenuation. This type of
attack is known as Predictable Channel Attack [28].
• Eve is assumed to have a full knowledge of the key extraction algorithm and the full
parameters.
2.5.4 Key Generation Protocols
Physical layer based key generation exploits the common randomness of the multipath
channel and the reciprocity of the channel to establish secret keys. The common ran-
domness is exploited from the properties of the wireless channel. a common practice is
to extract the shared randomness from the phase or the amplitude of the received signal.
In general the key generation process consist of: Collecting channel state information,
Channel Quantization and key agreement, Information reconciliation and privacy ampli-
fication.
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2.5.4.1 Collecting Channel State Information
In order for the communicating nodes to generate a secret key, they must be able to acquire
the channel state information(CSI) of the wireless channel. In order for two nodes, Alice
and Bob, to estimate the CSI of the wireless channel between them, they have to first
exchange known probe signals (pilot symbols) via the wireless channel[47].
This is such that, Alice within the first time slot, transmit her probe signal SAt1 to
Bob. Bob, upon receiving this measures the value received probe signal and extract the
CSI from it and record his estimate as SˆAt1 In the second time slot, Bob transmitted his
probe signal SBt2 to Alice. Alice record an estimate of this as Sˆ
B
t2.
It is imperative for Alice and Bob to perform the channel estimation as fast as possi-
ble, so as to avoid any decorrelation between the CSI which they have estimated( SˆAt1 &
SˆBt2). A common practice is to make the length of the time slot to be half of the channel
coherence time. Eve also try to derive an estimate of the CSI of the channel between
her and Alice/ Bob. However, her observation of the CSI is independent of Alice and
Bobs observation due to time variant multipath fading of the wireless channel. A variety
of channel state information which can be used includes the channel impulse response,
received signal strength indicator (RSSI) , signal envelope, signal phase.
Received Signal Strength Indicator:
The received signal strength (RSS) is a measurement of the power present in the received
signal. Using RSSI as the channel state information (CSI) has received a lot of attention
over the years due to ease of extracting the RSSI from off shelf wireless cards. Previous
studies on RSS based methods were focussed on exploiting the temporal variation, spatial
variation and frequency selectivity of the wireless channel. Other works were directed
towards exploiting multi antenna diversity for extracting he shared randomness and gen-
erating secret keys. However the using RSS provides a coarse grained CSI, thus it suffers
26
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND STUDY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
from a low key bit rate.In [48, ?] Mathur proposed a level crossing based key extrac-
tion algorithm. The algorithm starts by Alice and Bob alternatively probing the channel
between them so as to collect a relatively large block of consecutive channel estimate
(measure RSS) hA and hB
The size of each block is a configurable parameter. Afterwards they perform the level
crossing algorithm which is summarized below
• Alice parse her block of channel estimate to determine where m or more estimate
lie in an excursion above q+ or below q−
• A random subset of the excursion found in the first step is selected. Via public
discussion, she sends Bob the index of the channel estimate lying in the centre of
the excursion as a list.
• Bob upon receiving the index, checks whether his estimate hˆB contains at least m−1
channel estimates around that index send by Alice.
• Bob send a list of his L index which lies in the exclusion to Alice. The perform
quantization on each of the index in L that lie within the excursion
Jana in [26] proposed an Adaptive Secret Bit Generation (ASBG)which is a modified
version of that proposed by Mathur. Her method incorporates two well-known information
reconciliation and privacy amplification methods. The ASBG algorithm is summarized
in the following points.
• Alice and Bob collect a block of consecutive measurements just like Mathur, however
the size of each block is made small.
• For each block the calculate the adaptive threshold q+ = mean+α∗standarddeviation
and q− = mean− α ∗ standarddeviation where α ≥ 0
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• They perform step 1 in Mathur level crossing algorithm on their RSS measurement
dropping RSS estimate which fall within the range q− ≤ ˆhA,B ≤ q+
• They exchange a list of dropped RSS estimates retaining only the ones not dropped.
The RSS values retained are then quantized.
Having known that RSS provided by single channel estimation is coarse grained, thus
it does not provide enough entropy for a symmetric key. Multiple input multiple output
(MIMO) system have received a lot of attention over the years. This has brought about
the concept of exploiting the available spatial dimension to enhance the secrecy capacity
of the wireless channel. Generally a fading MIMO channel is such that the transmitter
receiver and adversary are equipped with NT ,NR and NE antennas respectively.
Zeng in [47] exploited the multiple antenna diversity of a MIMO system by measuring
the RSS value between each antenna pair in round robin way. Here Alice and Bob were
equipped with three antennas each (NT (A,B) = 3, NR(A,B) = 3) , thus they have nine
antenna pairs. The channel probing is done in a periodic pattern unlike the previous
methods discussed .The probing is such that the sub channels are probed periodically in
the order [A1−B1, A3−B3, A2−B1, A1−B3, A3−B2, A1−B2, A3−B1, A2−B3, A2−B2]
where Ax,Bx are the sub channel which arise from the Alice and Bob three antenna.
There are two reasons for this type of probing : (1) each sub channel has a limited
amount of dynamics which is constrained by the coherence time of the channel. (2) A
single bidirectional probing can be done much faster than the channel coherence time, thus
allowing multiple sub channels to be probed within the coherence time. Thus there enough
room to exploit the multiple antenna diversity by probing different sub channels in a round
robin way. Although using multiple channel estimation over time can provides enough
entropy for key generation, it however can contain correlated components which make it
difficult to verify the security level of the key material. In other to reduce this correlation,
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an approach is to utilize only a portion of the quantized channel profile by down-sampling
the raw CSI measurement in time to reduce the strong correlation. However this is done
at the expense of a reduced key generation rate. An alternative approach was proposed in
[44]. Here the discrete Karhunen Loeve transform was employed to convert the measured
channel samples into uncorrelated samples.
Secret key generation using RSS method is practically feasible with the existing wire-
less platform, however it has a very low key bit rate which limits its application due to the
intermittent connectivity in mobile environments.Table aas summarizes the practical key
extraction method for RSS methods In addition, the RSS based key generation method
depend on the channel variation or movement of the nodes to extract high entropy enough
for key generation.The effect of this is that the RSS technique is not suitable to key gen-
eration in static environments .Another major limitation of the RSS secret key generation
method is that they cannot be extended to support group key generation. The reason
for this is that measured RSS values obtained between communicating nodes cannot be
passed securely and efficiently from on node to another. thus gathering RSS information
across multiple nodes for generating and establishing group keys.
Channel Phase: The issues associated with the RSS based key generation scheme
are resolve with the use of channel phase as the channel state information. The phase
reciprocity of a wireless channel between two communication node (Alice and Bob) some
major advantages over the RSS method. Unlike the RSS,the channel phase of the received
signal has uniform distribution under narrow band fading channel. Current state of art in
signal processing allows for a very high resolution in the phase estimation of the wireless
channel, thus allowing for a higher key generation rate when the channel phase is used as
the CSI. A major advantage of using channel phase is that, the measure channel phase
value can be accumulated across multiple nodes.
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Table 2.1: Summary of existing secret key extraction using RSS.
Existing
Work
Device Technique BMR BGR
Mathur[49] Commercial
802.11a/b/g mo-
dem IP
Level-crossing 10−7 1 bit/pkt
Jana[26] Intel 3945ABG
802.11g WiFi card
Adaptive Secret
Bit Generation
∼ 3%− 6% 2− 3 bit/pkt
Zeng[47] Dell e5400 laptops Multi-antenna 0− 12% < 1 bit/pkt
Patwari[44] Crossbow TelosB
wireless sensors
Multi-bit Adap-
tive Quantization
0.04%− 2.2% 3 bit/pkt
Liu[50] MICAz sensor motes Group Key Ex-
traction
∼ 3% 2− 4 bit/pkt
Zan[30] Linux Atheros
AR5212 mini PC
Differential
Secret Key Gen-
eration
10−4 0 − 500
bit/sec
The earliest report on using channel phase for key generating via exploitation of the
channel properties is presented in[51]. In his work the differential phase between two
sinusoid is encoded to for key generation purpose. A key generation protocol based on
channel phase for wideband channel, such as OFDM system which exploits the inherent
randomness of the channel was proposed in [52]. In an OFDM system a single channel
utilizes multiple sub-carriers on adjacent frequencies. Each sub-carrier serves as a source
of randomness for key generation resulting in an increased key generation rate. Using a
wideband channel offers a large number of statistical independent degree of freedom, thus
allowing for the generation of large and secure keys. A major contribution his work is the
characterization of a key parameter , p(SINR,Q),which is the probability that two nodes
at the end of a wireless channel will generate the same quantization index as a function of
the operating signal to interference and noise ratio and the number of quantization levels
Q. Phase estimation is just the channel estimation with probe signal in the RSS based
technique.
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As stated prior, using channel phase as a CSI allows for the establishment of a group
key which can be used to improve security in a multicast transmission. Multicast trans-
mission is an efficient method when users request for identical information. Group key
generation and distribution without the aid of a key management centre has been a diffi-
cult task. A group key establishment protocol was proposed by [27]. The protocol start
with the communicating node selecting a node to be the master whose job is to generate
key among the other nodes which are the clients. During the group key generation, a
client transmit a fixed phase probe signal S12 to the master. The master uses this to
estimate the phase of the channel and records this as θ12 . The master node then selects
a probe signal with phase θ which ia applied identically to all the clients in the group.
from the selected probe signal, he computes the phase offset θ − θ12. Depending of the
phase offset, the master node transmit a probe signal whose phase has been steered using
he phase offset to the client. The clients on reception of the probe signal estimate the
steered phase θˆ and quantizes it to extract the key information.
When the size of the group increases the number of interaction between the nodes increases
linearly thus making the protocol inefficient for large group sizes. An efficient group key
generation using channel phase was presented by [53]. Here a time slotted round trip
scheme was employed, wherein in group key generation is achieved by first selecting one
of the communicating nodes as an initiator . The chosen node starts the generation pro-
cess by transmitting sinusoidal beacons from both the clockwise and counter-clockwise
direction. Each node estimates the phase of the sinusoidal beacon in its previous timeslot
and generates a periodic extension of the received beacon for transmitting in the next
time slot.The absolute phase of the beacon received by a node do not have any phase
offset relative to its own local reference time since all the nodes share a common reference
time. Thus it is possible to accumulate the channel phase informations along the trans-
mission circuit by periodic extension of the transmitted beacons at each node. Due to the
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channel reciprocity, the sum of phase estimates across the nodes obtained from clockwise
and counter-clockwise transmission are nearly identical at each node, thus a shared key
can be generated.
2.5.4.2 Quantization
In order for two nodes(Alice & Bob) to communicate securely, the must convert their
estimated CSI into identical bit string by performing quantization on their respectively
CSI. This require the derived key to meet to constraint
• Suitable Long: The key should have a length of 128 to 512 bits as required in
symmetric encryption algorithm.
• Statistically Random: The produced key bits should not suffer from statistically
defect which could be capitalized by an adversary.This implies that a generated
secret key of length N must provide N bits of uncertainty to an adversary who only
know the key generation algorithm
In a single carrier system, the quantization of the CSI can only be done in the time do-
main, while for a multi-carrier system like OFDM,secret bit can be extracted from the
OFDM sub-carriers in the frequency domain. This is done by quantizing the amplitude of
the CSI across several sub-carriers so as to increase the key generation rate.Many quanti-
zation schemes for translating the estimated CSI into a key bit string have been proposed
by several authors. Some of these schemes were designed to operate with the phase of
the complex channel impulse response, while most schemes proposed in literatures where
designed for system using RSS as the source of randomness.In general quantizers can be
categorized into two approach: Lossy and Lossless quantization.
Lossless Quantization Approach:
Lossless quantizer also referred to as Direct Quantization, do not discard any CSI input,
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rather uses them all to create quantized data in order to increase their bit generation rate.
On the other hand, it uses privacy amplification to increase the entropy of the bit stream.
Generally, a quantizer is described as lossless if one bit or more is obtained by quantiza-
tion of a single CSI sample (i.e ≥ 1 bit/sample). A lossless quantizer was used in [54]
to quantize the RSS value. the operation of this quantizer is such that it first determine
the position of the deep fade in the RSS measurement. It then encodes the measurement
into a bit stream by placing a 1 whenever the measurement is greater than the deep fade
threshold value and 0 otherwise. Since the quantizer is based on detecting the deep fades
and nor the complete channel impulse response, it is robust to noise associated with the
channel estimation procedure. Although the quantizer generates a key bit at a high rate,
the entropy of the of the generated key is low. The low entropy of the generated key is
compensated for by using privacy amplification to extra a high entropy bit stream from
the generated key. It should be noted that using privacy amplification requires a large
portion of the bit stream to be removed so as to extract a bit stream with high entropy,
thus the result bit rate is reduced.
Lossy Quantization Approach:
In the lossless quantizer discussed above, CSI samples at the border region of a 1 and
0 are more prone to error. The lossy quantization approach is an intelligent approach
which avoid these CSI samples by probabilistically discarding them to maintain a high
reliability (key agreement) and entropy. A quantizer based on the median value of the
RSS estimate was proposed in [55]. Here the median value of the measured RSS is used as
a threshold and measurement close to the to this value are discarded. This technique has
a low key agreement rate and low entropy thus making it not a good choice for generating
secret keys from the CSI samples. In [56] a quantizer based on the differential RSS values
is proposed.The quantizer computes the difference in the RSS values and employ two
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different thresholds to remove the differential values of the RSS estimates which tends
not to be similar. Just like the previous quantizer, this approach produces a bit stream
with a low entropy.
Another technique of employ two thresholds was reported by [48]. The employed
thresholds q+ = mean + α ∗ standarddeviation and q− = mean + α ∗ standarddeviation
discards RSS samples whose value are less than q+ and greater than q−. The key agreement
rate achieved by this quantizer is increased by considering only bit position which are in
the middle of blocks of equal length. M consecutive block of samples on one side of the
threshold are encoded onto 1 or a single 0. Regarding the entropy, random sub-sampling
was proposed to distil the key bit so as to increase the entropy of the generated bit
stream, however this comes at the cost of a low key bit rate. An entropy maximizing and
noise reducing quantizer is reported by asss, however this technique is computationally
intensive.
A multi-bit adaptive quantization(MAQ) is proposed in [44]. The MAQ approach
adaptively quantizes each measure CSI into an arbitrary number of bits without censoring.
CSI measured samples at the border of the threshold are prone to error because of he
high probability of measured samples to cross the other side of the threshold, thus it is
difficult to achieve a high key agreement rate using a fixed quantization method. The
MAQ approach however alters the quantization approach at both communicating nodes
based on the measurement at one of the nodes. Alice is made the leader node while Bob
as the follower node. Having known the distribution of the MAQ scheme quantizes the
CSI sample into Q equiprobable quantization levels. The thresholds for the equiprobable
quantization bins are generated the inverse of the cumulative density function of the CSI
measurements. Each quantization bin is encoded using Gray coding .
In order to increase the key agreement rate for the discussed multi-bit quantization,
a guard band is inserted between two consecutive quantization level. Thus when the
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communicating nodes observe a CSI which falls in the guard region, a key mismatch may
likely have occur and they node do not use that CSI observation for the key generation.
This requires a guard band indicator bit to be transferred between the two nodes indicating
that the observed CSI is within the guard band region. It is important to note the
exchange of guard band indicator bit do not disclose any information to the eavesdropper.
It is apparent that the larger the size of the guard band, the higher the probability of
key agreement, however this causes the number of extracted bit to be low as CSI samples
within the guard band region are discarded [47].
Quantizers with guard band are not optimal in the sense of the efficiency in the
extraction of secret keys. An approach to increase the efficiency should use all the CSI
samples for the key extraction while still maximizing key agreement. A technique based
on phase shifting is reported by Shehadeh in [42]. The idea is to convert the quantization
problem to a normal demodulation problem where channel samples are spread around
the constellation points rather than randomly scattered. A high key agreement and bit
extraction rate was achieved with phase shift approach.
The authors in [29] has report two approachs for performing quantization. The first
uses a rectangular quantization regions that are symmetric about the origin similar to the
quadrature amplitude modulation . This makes it possible to solve for the quantization
interval by only considering the in phase or quadrature dimension separately each with
√
Q intervals. The other approach which is referred as a channel quantization alternating
is considered where alternating staggered quantization maps are used instead of guard
bands. This quantizer is such that, at Alice, pairs of adjacent intervals are assigned
ascending quantization values and alternating quantization maps. When Alice observes a
given CSI in a given region, the quantization value symbols is added to its key and only the
quantization map value is transmitted over the public channel to Bob. The algorithm for
choosing the quantization map by Alice is that , a quantization map is chosen when where
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the observed CSI sample is farthest away from the edge, increasing the probability of key
agreement. Bob, based on the received quantization map received from Alice assigns the
corresponding quantization value symbol to the key. The exchange of quantization map
value does not reveal any information to Eve.
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In this chapter, the topic of physical layer authenticated encryption using high rate key
generation through shared randomness is investigated. First we develop our channel model
and associated threat model, and then perform a statical characterization of the channel,
showing the key capacity and achievable rates. After this, a physical layer secret key
generation scheme is discussed exploiting channel reciprocity in wireless systems. In order
to address the susceptibility of this family of schemes to active attacks, a novel physical
layer authentication encryption protocol is presented along with its extension to multi-
node networks in the presence of active adversaries. Unlike previous work in the area of
generating secret keys through shared randomness, it is demonstrated that the proposed
scheme is semantically secure with respect to chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext
attacks. Secondly, in order to increase the key generation rate, a multi-level quantization
algorithm with public feedback is discussed. It is demonstrated that the proposed scheme
is superior to direct information distillation approaches and can substantially increase the
key generation rates even at low and medium SNRs. Furthermore, the employment of
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this low-overhead feedback at the information distillation process can largely simplify the
information reconciliation process.
3.1 Introduction
In this work we exclusively focus on the channel model. In this framework, secret key
generation from wireless channel estimates includes three distinct phases [57]:
- Advantage distillation: Alice and Bob obtain estimates of their reciprocal channel state
information (CSI) and pass them through a suitable quantizer [49], [58] [31]. Commonly,
the received signal strength (RSS) has been used as the CSI parameter for generating
the shared key due to the ease in extracting RSS information using off the shelf wireless
cards, e.g. in [54, 48]. Alternatively, in [52], [53] the shared randomness of the multipath
wireless channel was exploited to generate a common secret key between a source and an
intended destination assuming that the adversarial channel is uncorrelated with the main
channel between the legitimate nodes.
- Information reconciliation: Discrepancies in the quantizer local outputs due to imper-
fect channel estimation are reconciled with an information reconciliation process through
public discussion.
- Privacy amplification: Applying universal hash functions to the reconciled information
ensures that the generated keys are uniformly distributed and completely unpredictable
by Eve.
Numerous investigations, e.g. [59, 60] ascertain that the unpredictable multipath prop-
agation and the associated fading characteristics of wireless media can be exploited for
extracting shared secret keys from suitable probe signals.
Instead of the RSS we use the phase of the local CSI estimates for information dis-
tillation. Following this approach the estimation error is shown to be approximately
Gaussian while the phase estimates at the adversary are uncorrelated to those at the
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legitimate nodes. Current state of the art in signal processing allows very high resolution
in phase estimation, and as a result high key generation rates are attainable. Secondly,
we propose a novel adaptive quantization scheme with multi-level public feedback, act-
ing in essence as the interface between the advantage distillation and the information
reconciliation phases. The proposed quantizer achieves a particularly high information
distillation rate at the two legitimate nodes (more than 90%) and allows a substantial
reduction in the complexity of the reconciliation process. The latter is implemented using
very low complexity forward error correction (FEC) codes across all signal to noise ratio
(SNR) regions. Finally, the generated secret keys are employed in a novel physical layer
authenticated encryption protocol. The complexity of the proposed scheme is minimal in
comparison to public key encryption schemes [61], rendering it a compelling approach for
establishing secure links in ad-hoc networks and device-to-device communication [62].
3.2 System model
3.2.1 Channel Model
In this section, the channel model for the communication system is defined. A legitimate
transmitter Alice intending to communicate with a legitimate receiver Bob in the presence
of an active attacker Eve is depicted in Fig.3.1. The wireless channel between Alice
and Bob is modelled as a Gaussian random variable h0 and is assumed to be reciprocal
and stationary during each transmission cycle and to change independently from one
transmission cycle to the next.
Secret key generation from the physical exploiting the properties of the wireless channel
begins with the legitimate communication nodes estimating their observed channel. In
each cycle the transmitter and receiver perform channel estimation by exchanging known
probe signal during the coherence time of the channel. The communicating nodes use the
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received known probe signal to estimate the channel impulse response. For example Alice
sends her probe signal to Bob. Bob upon receiving the probe signal uses it to estimate
his channel. It is imperative that both nodes exchange probe signal within the coherence
time of the channel. By coherence time, we mean the time duration where in the channel
state information (CSI) of the wireless channel is static. Practical radio system are half
duplex due to the hardware constraint , thus Alice must wait to receive a probe signal
from Bob before she can transmit a known probe back to Bob. The probe signal received
by the communicating nodes at the i-th cycle is given as,
YA(i) = X(i)h0(i) + nA(i), (3.1)
YB(i) = X(i)h0(i) + nB(i). (3.2)
Where, X(i) is the received known probe signal during the i-th cycle. nA and nB are
independent Gaussian noise process at Alice and Bob. During the i-th cycle Alice obtains
an estimate hA(i) and Bob an estimate hB(i) respectively of their reciprocal CSI, denoted
by h0(i), so that,
hA(i) = h0(i) + ∆hA(i), (3.3)
hB(i) = h0(i) + ∆hB(i), (3.4)
h0(i) = x0(i) + jy0(i), (3.5)
∆hA(i) = ∆xA(i) + j∆yA(i), (3.6)
∆hB(i) = ∆xB(i) + j∆yB(i), (3.7)
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Figure 3.1: Wireless system model [2].
where x0(i) and y0(i) are zero mean Gaussian random variables distributed as ∼
N (0, σ2) and ∆xA(i), ∆yA(i), ∆xB(i) and ∆yB(i) are zero mean unit variance Gaussian
random variables, ∼ N (0, 1). Using this modelling the variance σ2 of x0(i) and y0(i) is
equal to the channel SNR. Finally, Eve’s channel to Alice and Bob is uncorrelated with
either hA(i) and hB(i).
3.2.2 Threat Model
An adversary Eve, observers and intercept the exchange of the probe signal to derive her
own estimate of the Alice and Bob channel. Although the adversary can intercept probe
signals exchanged between Alice and Bob, the signal received by the adversary during the
i-th cycle is completely different and is given as,
RAE(i) = X(i)hE,A(i) + nE,A(i) (3.8)
RBE(i) = X(i)hE,B(i) + nE,B(i), (3.9)
Where hE,A and hE,B is the channel between Alice and Eve and Alice and Bob, while nE,A
and nE,B is the corresponding noise terms seen by Eve. If Eve is more than half wavelength
away from Alice and Bob, then her derive channel estimate will thus be uncorrelated from
the channel between Alice and Bob. This implies that, even though the probe signal is
sent in the clear, Eve is unable use her intercept of the probe signal to derive the estimate
of the channel between Alice and Bob.
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Assuming that the key generation protocol is publicly available and that Eve is an
active eavesdropper, the threat model is summarized as follows:
- Eve can intercept all information exchanges between Alice and Bob, i.e., Eve can mount
chosen plaintext attacks.
- Eve can modify the transmitted signals in a predetermined manner, i.e., Eve can mount
chosen ciphertext attacks and can act as a man-in-the-middle.
Alice sends a 
message to Bob  
Eve 
Eve is able to 
intercept  and alter 
the message 
 
Bob receives the 
message  
Alice Bob Communication 
Link 
 
Figure 3.2: Threat Model [3][4].
3.2.3 Channel Characterization
We focus on a single transmission cycle and drop related time indices. The central scope
of the remaining of this section is to discuss the achievable key rates that can be generated
at Alice and Bob from the angles of the estimated channel coefficients, i.e., the effective
distillation of the common parts of the correlated random variables θA and θB, which are
calculated locally at Alice and Bob, respectively, as:
θA = ∠hA = tan−1
(
y0 + ∆yA
x0 + ∆xA
)
, (3.10)
θB = ∠hB = tan−1
(
y0 + ∆yB
x0 + ∆xB
)
. (3.11)
In the following we investigate in further detail the distribution of θA (respectively of
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θB). Based on the assumption that σ
2  1, the following approximation holds:
y0 + ∆yA
x0 + ∆xA
=
y0
x0 + ∆xA
+
∆yA
x0 + ∆xA
' y0
x0
+
∆yA
x0
. (3.12)
Furthermore, exploiting the fact that the Taylor series expansion of tan−1 (x+ y) around
y = 0 can be written as
tan−1 (x+ y) = tan−1(x) +
y
x2 + 1
+ O(y2), (3.13)
we can establish the following approximations for small values of ∆yA
x0
 1, ∆yB
x0
 1
(these conditions are satisfied with very high probability when σ2  1, i.e., for medium
and high SNRs):
θA ' θ0 + ∆θA, (3.14)
θB ' θ0 + ∆θB, (3.15)
where,
θ0 = tan
−1
(
y0
x0
)
, (3.16)
∆θA =
∆yA
x0
x20
x20 + y
2
0
, (3.17)
∆θB =
∆yB
x0
x20
x20 + y
2
0
. (3.18)
The pdf of the ratio r = y0
x0
follows the standard Cauchy distribution and as a result
θ0 = tan
−1(r) is uniformly distributed in the range (−pi
2
, pi
2
) with zero-mean and variance
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pi
12
;
pR(r) =
1
pi(1− r2) , (3.19)
pΘ0(θ0) =

1
pi
, θ0 ∈
[−pi
2
, pi
2
]
,
0 otherwise.
(3.20)
On the other hand, the random variable ∆θA (∆θB respectively) is the product of two
dependent random variables; (i) of vA =
∆yA
x0
which follows a Cauchy distribution with
location parameter 0 and scale parameter 1
σ
and (ii) of u =
x20
x20+y
2
0
which follows an arcsine
distribution1 with mean 1
4
and variance 1
8
;
pV (vA) =
σ
pi(1 + σvA)2
, (3.21)
pU(u) = =

1
pi
√
u(1−u) , u ∈ (0, 1),
0 otherwise.
(3.22)
while the corresponding analysis holds for ∆θB as well.
During each transmission cycle and for a particular realization of the channel, the phase
estimate θA (respectively θB) of the common phase θ0 is a Gaussian random variable with
mean θ0 and variance σ
2
t , which is given as:
σ2t = EX0,Y0
[(
x0
x20 + y
2
0
)2]
− EX0,Y0
([
x0
x20 + y
2
0
])2
, (3.23)
as a function of the channel SNR σ2.
Another approach to estimating the variance of the system is discussed next. Just as
in the first approach, we investigated the distribution of θA (respectively of θB). However
1An arcsine distribution is a special case of the Beta distribution for shape parameters α = β = 12 .
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in this case based on the assumption that σ2  1, we make the following approximations:
y0 + ∆yA
x0 + ∆xA
=
y0
x0 + ∆xA
+
∆yA
x0 + ∆xA
(3.24)
' y0
x0
+
∆yA
x0 + ∆xA
. (3.25)
Furthermore, exploiting the fact that the Taylor series expansion of tan−1 (x+ y) around
y = 0 can be written as
tan−1 (x+ y) = tan−1(x) +
y
x2 + 1
+ O(y2), (3.26)
we can establish the following approximations for small values of ∆yA
x0+∆xA
 1, ∆yB
x0+∆xB
 1
(these conditions are satisfied with very high probability):
θA ' θ0 + ∆yA
x0 + ∆xA
x20
x20 + y
2
0
, (3.27)
θB ' θ0 + ∆yB
x0 + ∆xB
x20
x20 + y
2
0
. (3.28)
We set
∆θA =
∆yA
x0 + ∆xA
x20
x20 + y
2
0
, (3.29)
∆θB =
∆yB
x0 + ∆xB
x20
x20 + y
2
0
. (3.30)
Therefore, we are left with the task of characterizing the probability density function
(pdf) of the ratios of Gaussian random variables, i.e., of rA =
∆yA
x0+∆xA
and rB =
∆yB
x0+∆xB
.
This is addressed by transforming rA and rB into the standard form
a+x
b+y
, where x and y
are independent standard Gaussian random variables, x, y ∼ N (0, 1) and a, b non negative
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constants [63]. The pdf of rA (respectively rB) is given as:
f(rA) =
e−
1
2 (x20)
pi(1 + r2A)
[
1 + uAe
1
2
q2A
∫ qA
0
e−
1
2
x2d∆yA
]
, (3.31)
f(rB) =
e−
1
2 (x20)
pi(1 + r2B)
[
1 + uBe
1
2
q2B
∫ qB
0
e−
1
2
x2d∆yB
]
, (3.32)
where uA =
x0√
1+r2A
and uB =
x0√
1+r2B
.
f(rA) (respectively f(rB)) is a mixture of two densities,
f(rA) = pf1(rA) + (1− p)f2(rA), (3.33)
with p ∈ [0, 1], f1(r) the standard Cauchy density and f2(r) a bimodal density. It can be
shown that f(rA) (respectively f(rB)) is unimodal and can approximated by a zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with variance approximated as:
σ2t '
1
σ2/2 + 0.108σ/
√
2− 3.795 , (3.34)
where σ2 is the variance of x0 and y0. In Figs. 3.3 and 3.4 the Gaussian fit to the
histograms of ∆θA and ∆θB for σ
2 = 30 dB showcases the previous remarks.
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Figure 3.3: Gaussian fit to the histogram of ∆θA.
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Figure 3.4: Gaussian fit to the histogram of ∆θB.
As a result of this discussion, the quantities ∆θA , ∆θB and rA and rB from the first
and second approach respectively will in the following be approximated by zero-mean
Gaussian random variables with variance σ2t .
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Figure 3.5: Numerical evaluation of σ2t using 10
5 independent realizations of the channel
coefficients x0 and y0 as a function of the channel SNR.
Therefore, depending on our estimate of σ2t (i.e., of the system SNR) we will be able
to identify quantization approaches that will allow us to distil with very high probability
as many common bits as possible from the estimates of θA and θB.
3.2.4 Achievable Key Rates
It is a conventional to split into 3 stages the proof of channel coding[64]. These 3 stages
are,
• Converse: Which is the upper bound on the size of any code with given arbitrary
block-length and error probability.
• Achievabilty: which is a lower bound on the size of a code that can be guaranteed
to exist with given arbitrary block-length and error probability.
• Asymptotic: This is the bound on the log size of the code normalized by block-length
asymptotically coincide of the law of large number for system having memoryless
channel or for another ergodic theorem for system whose channel has memory.
It has been established in coding theorem that for a general class of channels which behave
ergodically, the highest rate at which information can be transmitted through a channel
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regardless of the desired error probability provided there is no limit on the bounds of the
block-length is referred to as the channel capacity. An important property of a channel
required to sustain the error probability at a given fixed finite block is the channel back-off.
The maximum rate at which Alice and Bob can extract identical secret bits from θA
and θB, is denoted hereafter as the phase secret key capacity C
(φ)
k and is upper bounded
by the mutual information of θA and θB in the channel model [65]. Based on the previous
discussion, the phase secret key capacity can be expressed as:
C
(φ)
k = I(θA; θB) = h(θA) + h(θB)− h(θA, θB)
= 2 log2
(
2pie
(
pi2
12
+ σ2t
))
− log2
(
(2pie)2
[(
pi2
12
+ σ2t
)2
−
(
pi2
12
)2])
= log2
1 + pi2/12
2σ2t +
σ4t
pi2/12
 .
(3.35)
C
(φ)
k is only achievable if infinite blocklength encoders are employed at the information
reconciliation stage to correct for any discrepancies between θA and θB. In the realistic
scenario in which finite blocklength encoders are used instead, we can estimate the achiev-
able phase secret key rate, denoted by R
(φ)
k , for any blocklength n and non zero (output)
error probability  by employing the results of [66]. The achievable phase secret key rate
can then be expressed as:
R
(φ)
k (n, ) = C
(φ)
k −
√
V
n
Q−1() +
1
2n
log n. (3.36)
From Eq.(3.36) V denotes the channel dispersion–a quantity which describes the back-
off from capacity in the finite blocklength regime; using the additive white Gaussian model,
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Figure 3.6: Achievable phase secret key rates in the finite blocklength regime.
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Figure 3.7: Blocklength n required to achieve desired fractional rate η = R
(φ)
k /C
(φ)
k as a
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[66]–eqs. (292-293), the channel dispersion with respect to C
(φ)
k can be expressed as
V =
(pi4 + 48σ2t pi
2 + 288σ4t ) pi
4
(pi4 + 24σ2t pi
2 + 144σ4t )
2
log22 e. (3.37)
Finally, in (3.36) Q =
∫∞
x
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt,  is the error probability, 0 <  < 1, and n is
the blocklength. In Fig. 3.6 R
(φ)
k is depicted as a function of the channel SNR σ
2. As
expected, R
(φ)
k tends to C
(φ)
k for fixed  and SNR as the blocklength n of the encoder
increases.
Finally, in a direct application of the previous results, the required blocklength n is
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evaluated with respect to a target fractional rate η = R
(φ)
k /C
(φ)
k . For illustration purposes,
the required blocklength as a function of  is depicted for η = 0.5 and η = 0.9 in Fig 3.7.
These results are employed in Subsection IV-B to determine the encoder blocklength at
the information reconciliation phase.
3.3 Secret Key Generation
3.3.1 Advantage Distillation
In order to establish a random shared secret key, Alice and Bob perform channel quantiza-
tion simultaneously on their channel phase estimate θA(t1....tn) and θB(t1....tn),converting
them into a binary bit sequence BA(t1....tn) and Bb(t1....tn) respectively. Based on our
estimate of σ2 we split the range from (−pi
2
, pi
2
) to quantization levels of width at most lσt
(e.g. l = 6). The number of quantization intervals, Q, is given by
Q =
⌊
pi
lσt
⌋
, (3.38)
where b · c denotes the floor function. The phase estimate θA (respectively of θB) is
mapped to quantization interval q ∈ {1, . . . , log2(Q)} using the mapping:
bxe = q if x ∈
[
pi(q + 1)
Q
,
piq
Q
)
− pi
2
, q = 0, 2, . . . , Q− 1, (3.39)
where b · e denotes quantization. In the present protocol we employ this straightforward
approach of a quantizer with no feedback while later on in Section 3.4 we will discuss an
improved design using public feedback. Using gray codes, we encode the channel phase
samples into key bits whose length is upper bound by. Fig. 3.8 shows the information
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reconciliation rate for a simple quantizer for a simple quantizer as a function of SNR.
K ≤ log2(Q) (3.40)
Due to error in the channel estimation which arises from system noise, it is imperative to
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Figure 3.8: Information reconciliation rate (IRR) for the quantizer without feedback.
reconcile discrepancies which may exist in the key bits sequence generated by Alice and
Bob using appropriate error correction techniques.
3.3.2 Information Reconciliation Phase Using FEC
A low complexity information reconciliation approach is built using standard linear block
codes as follows: Alice and Bob use length n buffers to store length n-tuples at the
output of the quantizer. These n-tuples are here denoted by kA and kB respectively.
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Subsequently, using a predetermined block code they estimate locally their respective
syndromes, denoted by sA and sB and the corresponding error patterns eA and eB so that
kA = k0 ⊕ eA. (3.41)
kB = k0 ⊕ eB. (3.42)
In essence, kA and kB correspond to θA and θB respectively, k0 to θ0 and eA, eB to ∆θA
and ∆θB respectively.
For Bob to derive an estimate of kA, it is required that Alice communicates her syn-
drome sA to Bob via public discussion as will be explained later. In Section 4.2 we will
demonstrate that although the syndrome will be sent in the clear, the key generation
scheme combined with an authenticated encryption protocol can still be robust to active
attackers and withstand chosen ciphertext attacks. At present, we concentrate on how
Alice and Bob ca establish a common secret key. Bob, given sA can derive an estimate of
kˆA of kA as:
kˆA = k0 ⊕ eA = kB ⊕ eB ⊕ eA. (3.43)
It is important to note that by communicating sA in the clear, Eve by mere interception
can also estimate eA. The following Lemma discusses the related information leakage.
Lemma 1 Using the key distillation scheme discussed in (24)-(28), the transmission of
the syndrome sA in the clear does not leak more than n−k bits of information with respect
to kA.
The proof for this is stated as follows:
sA can be used to obtain eA. On the other hand k0 and eA are independent because
they correspond to the quantization of two independent continuous random variables,
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namely of θ0 and ∆θA. As a result, we have that
H(kA) = n, (3.44)
H(kA|sA) = H(kA|eA) = H(k0) = k. (3.45)
Therefore, the transmission of sA does not leak more than n − k bits of information as
claimed.
As a result of Lemma 1, the effective size of the key space of kA is 2
k and its entropy
is k bits. To this end, a compression of the encoder output to remove redundant bits is
required and is performed in the privacy amplification stage. The overall key generation
rate can be estimated as the product of the IDR, the IRR and the rate of the FEC. In Figs.
3.9 and 3.10 the IRR is depicted for a fixed and adaptive simple quantizer (3.38)-(3.39)
with l = 6.
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Figure 3.9: Information reconciliation rate (IRR) for the quantizer without feedback.
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Figure 3.10: Information reconciliation rate (IRR) for the adaptive quantizer without
feedback.
Finally, further exploiting the use of public feedback, it is possible to design a key
validation process as follows. First, Bob transmits to Alice his estimated syndrome sB
which Alice uses to derive eB. Using (28), Alice can then estimate kˆA and reversing the
encoder function to finally obtain sˆA. The validation aims at ensuring that kˆA = kA,
by checking that sˆA = sA . Blocks which fail the validation test are subject to further
processing or are discarded.
3.3.3 Privacy Amplification
The information reconciliation phase requires public discussion of syndromes for error
correction, thus revealing some information to Eve. It has been proven that in [67] that the
use of privacy amplification techniques can effectively transform a weakly secure channel
into a strong secure channel, in which the adversary can at most observe a negligible
absolute amount of information. Interesting, strong secrecy can be obtained from weak
secrecy for free through the use of a public feedback channel. The core idea behind
these techniques is the use of appropriate feedback message information chosen to provide
enough information to Bob’s secrecy decoder so as to completely resolve any residual
ambiguity, while at the same time leaking only a negligible absolute amount of information
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to Eve. In the next chapter, we proposed a novel quantizer which uses a feedback for
information distillation and privacy implication. Unlike other quantizer, our proposed
quantizer is designed secret keys to distil and amplify their privacy simultaneously with
and very high performance.
To complete the key generation process, Alice and Bob distil the final keys using a
universal hash function to compress the the mutually established keys sequence. This is
achieved by applying an appropriate compression function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k where
k/n is the FEC rate. The compression function g is chosen randomly from a family of
universal hash functions G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k so that Eve has no knowledge of the final
key K where K = g(kˆA) = g(kA). As a result of the use of information distillation and
privacy amplification, Alice and Bob distil a secret key while the absolute amount of
information leaked to Eve is kept arbitrary small.
3.4 Improving the Key Generation Rate
3.4.1 Information Distillation with Guard band (GB)
In order to increase the information distillation rate at the output of the quantizer, we
incorporate guard bands at the edges of the quantization intervals to mitigate channel
phase information samples which may cause discrepancies in the key bit distilled by Alice
and Bob. A straightforward approach can be based on the following observation:
• if θA (respectively θB) is at most ±σt away from the centre of the quantization
interval then the corresponding secret key of length k can be generated with an
agreement rate in the range of 97.7%-100%,
• if on the contrary θA(respectivelyθB) is more than ±σt away from the centre of the
quantization interval then the least significant bit (LSB) of the generated secret key
is disregarded as a lesser than 97.7% rate of key agreement would be guaranteed
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(and presumably this is not acceptable). The threshold of 97.7% can be varied
accordingly (the specific choice here is only for illustration purposes).
undefined
key=1
undefined
key=0
key=00
undefined
key=01
key=11
key=10
/2
- /2
Figure 3.11: Example of quantization levels for 6σt =
pi
4
.
The use of guard band necessitate a public discussion phase wherein guard band indicator
(GBI) bits are exchange between Alice and Bob, indicating that the observed channel
phase samples falls in the guard band region. It is important to note that the exchange
of GBI bits during the public discussion phase does not incur any loss of secrecy because
the quantization intervals and guard band regions are equiprobable. Alice been master
node, first announces the channel phase samples used for key generation by transmitting
the corresponding channel phase index to Bob, vice versa, thus both nodes agree on the
channel phase samples for the key extraction process. The key establishment process for
a quantizer with guard band is summarized in Fig.3.12. The channel phase information
of both Alice and Bob are mapped onto quantisation interval using:
bxe = q if x ∈
[
pi(q + 1)mpi
Q
,
piq −mpi
Q
)
− pi
2
, q = 0, 2, . . . , Q− 1,m = 0.1, 0.2 . . . 0.4
(3.46)
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Where m, is a parameter that determine the size of the guard band. By increasing the
size of the guard band via the parameter m, the information reconciliation rate (IRR
) is increase substantially. On the other hand, the information distillation rate (IDR)
is reduced due to the discarding of phase samples within the guard band region. Figs
3.13-3.18 shows the IRR and IDR for the key extraction process with as a function of the
SNR for various buffer sizes.
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Figure 3.12: Secret Key Generation Flow Chart
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Figure 3.13: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=2
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Figure 3.14: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=4
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Figure 3.15: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=8
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Figure 3.16: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=16
60
CHAPTER 3. SECRET KEY GENERATION
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
co
nc
ili
at
io
n 
ra
te
 (I
RR
)
SNR(dB)
 
 
m=0.4
m=0.3
m=0.2
m=0.1
(a)
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
SNR(dB)
 
 
m=0.4
m=0.3
m=0.2
m=0.1
(b)
Figure 3.17: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=32
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Figure 3.18: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for different guard band size (m) , Q=64
Increase in the IRR and IDR of Alice and Bob as a function of the SNR and the
guard band size which is scaled by m for a quantizer is detailed below. Increasing the
parameter m increases the size of the guard band size, thus phase samples which are likely
to introduce key mismatch errors are discarded resulting in an improved IRR, however
this decreases the IDR of the quantizer because more phase samples are discarded. We
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note the for a given Q and m, using higher SNR values increases the IDR, however this
reduces as Q increases. As an example the IDR as shown in Fig.3.19, for Q = 2 and
m = 0.1, is increased from 65.4% to 74.2% at 10 dB and 25 dB respectively, while in Fig.
3.24 at Q = 64 and m = 0.1 the IDR was 74% at all SNR. Figs. 3.19-3.24 shows the IRR
and IDR for various quantization levels.
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Figure 3.19: IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=2
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Figure 3.20: IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=8
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Figure 3.21: IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=8
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Figure 3.22: IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=16
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Figure 3.23: IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=32
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Figure 3.24: IRR and IDR as a function of Guard Band Size(m) , Q=64
3.4.2 Quantizer with Redundancy
Having known that the channel phase estimate between Alice and Bob is reciprocal and
spatially correlated when both nodes exchanges pilot symbols within the coherence time of
the channel. As one will expect, the distilled secret key from the channel phases estimate
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of Alice and Bob should always agree if Alice and Bob exchange pilot symbol during the
coherence time. However due to noise, Alice and Bob obtain an imperfect channel phase
estimate (3.7). Another way to improve on the performance of the key IRR is the use of
redundant bits during the channel estimation phase. Here t multiple pilot symbols are
exchange during the coherence time by both nodes for channel phase estimation. The
impact of noise is reduced by using a moving average method of width t.
θ1 + θ2 + θ3 + ...+ θt
t
θi = θ0 + ni i = 1, 2.t
Where t is the number pilot symbols exchange during each coherence time. In my
simulations I have considered t = 4.
Although this method has a better IRR compared to the use of gaurdbands, it is limited
by the fact that within each coherence time, only one channel phase samples (average
of the t phase samples) is used in the key extraction process. Thus only
1
t
of the total
channel phase samples is available for key extraction process, which implies that the IDR
achieved using this method is
1
t
the rate achieved with a plain quantizer, producing a very
low key bit rate. Simulation results in Fig.3.25 shows the IDR for various quantization
levels signal to noise ratio.
It is apparent that using redundant channel phase samples within the coherent time of
the channel between both nodes increases the percentage key agreement. The performance
of the plain quantizer with redundant phase samples is compared with a plain quantizer
with one pilot symbol per coherence time for quantization levels 8, 16 and 32 in the
Fig.3.26.
We can also employ the quantizer with guard band to further increase the percentage
key agreement between Alice and Bob. However since this quantizer is a lossy quantizer,
the key bit rate is furthered reduced. As expected, the performance of the quantizer with
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Figure 3.25: Percentage Key Agreement vs SNR for Plain Quantizer with Redundancy
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Figure 3.26: Plain Quantizer vs Quantizer with Redundancy ; Percentage Key Agreement
vs SNR
guard band using channel phase redundancy is improved compared to the traditional
quantizer with guard band however at the expense of a very low key bit rate. The
results below shows the percentage key agreement and used channel phase samples for
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quantization levels Q = 2 to Q = 64. It should not be confused that the percentage used
channel samples is calculated over
1
t
of the total channel phase samples.
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Figure 3.27: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 2
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Figure 3.28: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 4
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Figure 3.29: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 8
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Figure 3.30: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 16
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Figure 3.31: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 32
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Figure 3.32: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR for Quantizer with Guard Band using
Redundancy, Q = 64
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CHAPTER 4
ENHANCED KEY GENERATION AND
PHYSICAL LAYER AUTHENTICATION
ENCRYPTION
In this chapter, a novel quantization scheme is proposed with a multi-level public feedback
acting as the interface between the advantage distillation and information reconciliation
phases. The proposed quantization approach is able to achieve high information recon-
ciliation rate and information distillation rate thus allowing a substantial reduction in
the complexity of the reconciliation process. Also in the chapter, a novel physical layer
authentication encryption protocol is developed. The complexity of the proposed proto-
col is minimal in comparison to public key encryption schemes, rendering it a compelling
approach for establishing secure links in ad-hoc networks and device-to-device communi-
cation.
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4.1 Quantizer with Public Feedback
In the quantizer discussed in the preceding chapter, guard bands were introduced to
improve the IRR. However this was at the of a low IDR rate due to the discarding of
channel phase samples when they fall within the guard band regions. Also the use of
redundant bit to improve the performance of the IRR of the quantizer was seen to impair
the distillation rate of the quantizer by a factor of 1
t
, where t is the number of redundant
phase samples bit observed during the coherence time of the channel.
In this work, we propose a novel quantization approach which increases the IRR and
IDR at the output of the quantizer. We propose the following public feedback approach:
each quantization interval is split into n slots as shown in Fig. 4.1.
Alice determines the quantization interval and the slot index iA ∈ {1, . . . , n} of her
estimated phase sample; the latter is transmitted to Bob. Similarly, Bob identifies the
quantization interval and the slot index iB ∈ {1, . . . , n} of his own estimate. Based on
the public feedback received by Alice he then computes the likelihood that his own es-
timate is in the same quantization interval as Alice’s. According to a slot agreement
0 1 2 3 Q-1 … Quantizer 
Alice Slot 
Bob Slot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
±0 
±1 
±2 
Figure 4.1: Proposed quantizer with public feedback
(SA)-disagreement (SD) protocol he announces the retaining or rejection of the current
output of the quantizer. No useful information is revealed to Eve when Alice and Bob
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exchange slot indices. This is due to the fact that irrespective of the quantization level, all
slots are equiprobable. Below we explain alternative SA − SD protocols for a quantizer
with eight slots (n = 8) in each quantization interval.
4.1.1 SA− SD(0) : Hard decision (same slot)
In this approach Alice and Bob must be in the same slot, otherwise the observed channel
phase and the output of the quantizer is discarded, i.e.,
SA− SD(0) =
 1, if iA = iB, iA, iB ∈ {1 . . . , n}⊥, otherwise, (4.1)
where ⊥ denotes rejected.
As an example, consider Fig.4.1. If Alice has a slot position five (n = 5) and Bob has a
slot position five (n = 5) , a key will be generated and agreed upon else it will be discarded.
A key disagreement occurs when Alices channel phase sample is in the qth quantiza-
tion interval, let say qA = 2 and has a slot position n = 5, while Bob is in a different
quantization interval, say qB = 3 but has a slot position of n = 3. Since the quantizer
generates and agrees on secret keys based on the slot positions of Alice, the quantizer will
erroneously generate and agree on the corresponding key of qA and qB. When the number
of slot division within a quantization interval is increase, the percentage key agreement
rate is seen to increase. This is so because, increasing the number of slot division within
each quantization interval of the quantizer decreases the probability that the other nodes
channel sample will fall on the same slot position on a different quantization interval q
thus improving the IRR.
The improvement of the IRR comes at the expense of the IDR. The number of channel
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phase samples used for the key generation and agreement procedure decreases when the
number of slot division within each quantization interval increases. This is so because as
the number of slot division increases, the likelihood that the observed phase samples of
the two nodes will fall on the same time slot n within the same quantization interval q is
reduced, thus more channel samples will be discarded. Figs. 4.2-4.7 shows the IRR and
corresponding IDR for the key generation procedure.
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Figure 4.2: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 2, SA− SD(0).
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Figure 4.3: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 4, SA− SD(0).
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Figure 4.4: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 8, SA− SD(0).
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Figure 4.5: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 16, SA− SD(0).
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Figure 4.6: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 32, SA− SD(0).
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Figure 4.7: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 64 , SA− SD(0).
A simulation for the adaptive quantization is performed. The number of quantization
intervals Q is determined based on the variance of the channel. Equations 3.38 from
Chapter 3 is applied to determine Q at each SNR. The value of l is made unity here.
Other simulation parameters remains the same as above. Figs.4.8 and 4.9 shows the
IRR and IDR for the adaptive quantizer for this approach, while Fig. 4.10 shows the
corresponding key length in bits at the output of the quantizer. It should be noted that
the secret key length in bits at the output of the quantizer which is seen to be constant
for ranges of SNRs (thus has the step shape) is due to the floor function used in equation
3.40 from Chapter 3 in the simulation. If the floor function was removed from 3.40 the
step like shape changes to a straight line graph.
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Figure 4.8: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(0), IRR as a function of SNR.
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Figure 4.9: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(0), IDR as a function of SNR.
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Figure 4.10: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(0), Key length at the output of the quantizer as
a function of SNR.
The IRR is improved as the number of slots within each quantization interval increases.
This is so because the likelihood that Alice and Bobs phase samples will be in the same
slot n but different quantization interval is decreased, thus reducing the probability of
disagreement in keys. On the other hand, less key bits are distilled due to decrease in
the IDR as the number of slots increase. This is due to the fact that as the number of
slot division increases, Alice and Bob phase samples tend to have different slot number,
resulting in the discarding of such samples. Figs. 4.11-4.16 shows the effect of increasing
the number of slot within each quantization interval on the IDR and IRR.
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Figure 4.11: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n , Q = 2, SA− SD(0)
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Figure 4.12: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n Q = 4, SA− SD(0)
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Figure 4.13: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n , Q = 8, SA− SD(0)
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Figure 4.14: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n Q = 16, SA− SD(0)
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Figure 4.15: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n Q = 32, SA− SD(0)
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Figure 4.16: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n Q = 64, SA− SD(0)
4.1.2 SA− SD(1) : Soft decision ±1 slot indices:
In this Alice and Bob must be at most one slot apart otherwise the observed phase sample
is discarded, i.e.,
SA− SD(1) =
 1, if |iA − iB| ≤ 1, iA, iB ∈ {1 . . . , n}⊥, otherwise. (4.2)
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where ⊥ denotes rejected.
As an example, if Alice is in slot with index iA = 5 as shown in Fig. 4.1, the quantizer
output is retained only when,
• Bob is in a slot with indices iB = 4, or
• Bob is in a slot with indices iB = 5, or
• Bob is in a slot with indices iB = 6.
If Alice and Bob does not satisfies the above, then the key generation and agreement
procedure is cancelled and the current observed channel phase sample is discarded. If
Alice’s channel phase sample is in qth quantization interval, let say qA = 2 and has a slot
position iA = 5 while Bobs observed channel phase has slot indices iB = 4, 5, 6 but in a
different quantization interval, say qB = 3. Since the quantizer generates and agrees on a
secret key according to (4.2) , then the quantizer will erroneously generate and agree on
the resulting in a key disagreement.
Just like the SA − SD(0), when the number of slot division within a quantization
interval is increase, the IRR is seen to increase. This is so because, increasing the number
of slot division within each quantization interval of the quantizer decreases the probability
that the other node’s channel sample will fall on the same slot position or one of his next
adjacent slot position on a different quantization interval q thus improving the IRR. The
number of channel phase samples used for the key generation and agreement procedure
decreases with increase in the number of slot division within each quantization interval
thus decreasing the key generation rate. This is so because, as the number of slot division
increases, the likelihood that Alice’s observed phase sample will fall on a slot position
which is the same as Bobs slot position or one of his next adjacent slot positions ,within
the same quantization interval q is decreased causing more channel samples to be discarded
resulting in a decreased IDR. Figs. 4.17-4.22 shows the IRR and the corresponding IDR
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for this approach.
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Figure 4.17: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 2 , SA− SD(1).
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Figure 4.18: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 4 , SA− SD(1).
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Figure 4.19: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 8 , SA− SD(1).
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Figure 4.20: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 16 , SA− SD(1).
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Figure 4.21: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 32 , SA− SD(1).
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Figure 4.22: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 64 , SA− SD(1).
Just as in the SA − SD(0) approach, we showed the simulation for the adaptive
quantization. The number of quantization intervals Q is determined based on the variance
σt of the channel. Equations 3.38 from Chapter 3 is applied to determine Q at each SNR.
The value of l is made unity here. Other simulation parameters remains the same as
above. Figs.4.23 and 4.24 shows the IRR and IDR for the adaptive quantizer for this
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approach, while Fig. 4.25 shows the corresponding key length in bits at the output of
the quantizer. It should be noted that the secret key length in bits at the output of the
quantizer which is seen to be constant for ranges of SNRs (thus has the step shape) is due
to the floor function used in equation 3.40 from Chapter 3 in the simulation. If the floor
function was removed from 3.40 the step like shape changes to a straight line graph.We
see that the key length at the output of the quantizer remains the same, however there
is an increase in the secret key bit rate which will be shown later. Also the key length
when using slot division of n=4 and 8 is the same as seen in Fig. 4.25, however the key
bit rate are different.
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Figure 4.23: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(1), IRR as a function of SNR.
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Figure 4.24: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(1), IDR as a function of SNR.
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Figure 4.25: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(1), Key length at the output of the quantizer as
a function of SNR.
In this approach, the IRR is improved as the number of slots within each quantization
interval increases. This is so because the likelihood that Alice and Bobs phase samples
will be in the same slot n but different quantization interval is decreased, thus reducing
the probability of disagreement in keys. On the other hand, less key bits are distilled due
to decrease in the IDR as the number of slots increase. This is due to the fact that as
the number of slot division increases, Alice and Bob phase samples tend to have different
slot number, resulting in the discarding of such samples. Figs. 4.26-4.31 shows the effect
of increasing the number of slot within each quantization interval on the IDR and IRR.
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Figure 4.26: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 2, SA− SD(1)
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Figure 4.27: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 4, SA− SD(1)
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Figure 4.28: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 8, SA− SD(1)
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Figure 4.29: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 16, SA− SD(1)
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Figure 4.30: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 32, SA− SD(1)
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Figure 4.31: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 64, SA− SD(1)
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4.1.3 SA− SD(2) : Soft decision ±2 slot indices:
In this approach, Alice and Bob can be at most two slots apart otherwise the observed
phase sample is discarded, i.e.,
SA− SD(2) =
 1, if |iA − iB| ≤ 2, iA, iB ∈ {1, . . . , n}⊥, otherwise. (4.3)
where ⊥ denotes rejected.
As an example, if Alice is in slot with index iA = 5 and announces this to Bob as
shown in Fig. 4.1, the quantizer output is retained and a key will then be generated only
when,
• Bob has a slot position iB = 3, or
• Bob has a slot position iB = 4, or
• Bob has a slot position iB = 5, or
• Bob has a slot position iB = 6, or
• Bob has a slot position iB = 7.
If Alice and Bob does not satisfies the above, then the key generation and agreement
procedure is cancelled and the current observed channel phase sample is discarded. If
Alice’s channel phase sample is in qth quantization interval, e.g qA = 2, and has a slot
position iA = 5 while Bobs observed channel phase has slot indices iB = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 but in
a different quantization interval, e.g qB = 3. Since the quantizer generates and agrees on
a secret key according to (4.3), then the quantizer will erroneously generate and agree on
the resulting in a key disagreement.
It is observed that when the number of slot division within a quantization interval
is increased, the IRR is seen to increase. This is so because, increasing the number of
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slot division within each quantization interval of the quantizer decreases the probability
that the other node’s channel sample will fall on the same slot position or one of his next
adjacent slot position on a different quantization interval q thus improving the IRR. The
number of channel phase samples used for the key generation and agreement procedure
decreases with increase in the number of slot division within each quantization interval
thus decreasing the key generation rate. This is so because, as the number of slot division
increases, the likelihood that Alice’s observed phase sample will fall on a slot position
which is the same as Bobs slot position or one of his next adjacent slot positions ,within
the same quantization interval q is decreased causing more channel samples to be discarded
resulting in a decreased IDR. Figs. 4.32-4.37 shows the IRR and the corresponding IDR
for this approach.
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Figure 4.32: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 2 , SA− SD(2).
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Figure 4.33: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 4 , SA− SD(2).
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Figure 4.34: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 8 , SA− SD(2).
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Figure 4.35: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 16 , SA− SD(2).
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Figure 4.36: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 32 , SA− SD(2).
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Figure 4.37: IRR and IDR as a function of SNR, Q = 64 , SA− SD(2).
Just as in the SA − SD(0) and SA − SD(1) approaches, a simulation to determine
the IRR, IDR and quantizer key length at various signal power is carried out for an
adaptive quantization using the current approach. The number of quantization intervals
Q is determined based on the variance σt of the channel. Equations 3.38 from Chapter 3 is
applied to determine Q at each SNR. The value of l is made unity here. Other simulation
parameters remains the same as above. Figs.4.38 and 4.39 shows the IRR and IDR for the
adaptive quantizer for this approach, while Fig. 4.40 shows the corresponding key length
in bits at the output of the quantizer. It should be noted that the secret key length in
bits at the output of the quantizer which is seen to be constant for ranges of SNRs (thus
has the step shape) is due to the floor function used in equation 3.40 from Chapter 3 in
the simulation. If the floor function was removed from 3.40 the step like shape changes to
a straight line graph. We see that the key length at the output of the quantizer remains
the same, however there is an increase in the secret key bit rate which will be shown later.
Also the key length when using slot division of n=4 and 8 is the same as seen in Fig. 4.40,
however the key bit rate are different.
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Figure 4.38: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(2), IRR as a function of SNR.
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Figure 4.39: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(2), IDR as a function of SNR.
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Figure 4.40: Adaptive quantizer SA-SD(2), Key length at the output of the quantizer as
a function of SNR.
In the SA− SD(2) approach , an improved IRR is achieved compared to the original
quantizer when the number of slot within each quantization interval is increased. This is
so because the likelihood that Alice and Bobs phase samples will be in the same slot n but
different quantization interval is decreased, thus reducing the probability of disagreement
in keys. On the other hand, less key bits are distilled due to decrease in the IDR as
the number of slots increase. This is due to the fact that as the number of slot division
increases, Alice and Bob phase samples tend to have different slot number, resulting in
the discarding of such samples. Figs.4.41-4.46 shows the effect of increasing the number
of slot within each quantization interval on the IDR and IRR.
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Figure 4.41: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 2, SA− SD(2)
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Figure 4.42: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 4, SA− SD(2)
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Figure 4.43: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 8, SA− SD(2)
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Figure 4.44: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 16, SA− SD(2)
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Figure 4.45: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 32, SA− SD(2)
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
co
nc
ili
at
io
n 
ra
te
 (I
RR
)
No of Slot (n)
 
 
SNR=10
SNR=15
SNR=20
SNR=25
(a)
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
co
nc
ili
at
io
n 
ra
te
 (I
RR
)
No of Slot (n)
 
 
SNR=10
SNR=15
SNR=20
SNR=25
(b)
Figure 4.46: IRR and IDR as a function of number of slots n, Q = 64, SA− SD(2)
It is apparent that the Quantizer with slot divisions achieves a better reliability in
terms of key agreement rate when the quantizer uses the same slot protocol at the expense
of a very low key generation rate which is determined from the percentage of the used
channel phase samples. Fig.4.47 show the percentage key agreement rate and percentage
of the used channel phase samples of the three protocols for a quantizer with eight levels
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(Q = 8). Although the Same Slot and ±1 Adjacent Slot Position protocol have a slightly
better key agreement performance than the ±2 Adjacent Slot Position, they both have
a low key generation rate determined from their percentage key agreement rate. This
makes the ±2 Adjacent Slot Position protocol suitable for practical application due to its
comparatively higher key generation rate.
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Figure 4.47: Performance of Same Slot Position ,±1 Adjacent Slot Position and ±2 Ad-
jacent Slot Position (a) Key Agreement vs SNR (b) Used Channel Phase Samples vs
SNR
4.1.4 Secret Key Bit Rate
In this section we investigate by simulations the secret key bit rate of the proposed quan-
tization schemes. In the below calculation for the secret key bit rate, the feedback bits
have not been considered. We show the secret key rate to be given as,
RKey = log2(Q)×
IRR× IDR
100
× k
n
(4.4)
It is apparent that the SA-SD(0) has the lowest secret key bit rate, this is because it
discard more phase samples to achieved a high IRR
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Figure 4.48: Secret Key Bit Rate as a function of SNR.
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Figure 4.49: Secret Key Bit Rate as a function of SNR.
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Figure 4.50: Secret Key Bit Rate as a function of SNR.
4.1.5 Probability of Error at the Information Distillation Pro-
cess
Let Alice’s and Bob’s quantizers generate log2Q-tuples denoted by qA and qB respectively.
In the outlined approaches an error (disagreement in the quantizer outputs at Alice and
Bob) occurs when the observed phase sample of Alice and Bob is in a slot position which
satisfies (4.1),(4.2) and (4.3) but in different quantization interval, that is qA 6= qB. We
show in detail the probability of key disagreement for the approach below:
In more detail, the probability of error can be expressed as:
Pe =
Q∑
q = 1
q 6= log 2(qB)
∫ qu
ql
∫ pi
2
−pi
2
1
σt
√
2pi
exp−(θ − θ0)
2
2σ2t
dθ
=
Q− 1
n
, (4.5)
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where θ0 and θ have been define in 3.18 and 3.28, while ql and qu are the corresponding
limits in the quantizer slot outside the current quantization interval, so that as we run
across all possible values of θ we start from −pi
2
and we increase up to pi
2
. If on the contrary
we let θ0 take any possible value on the real axis (and not be confined on the −pi/2 : pi/2
range then the results would be greatly simplified because apparently
∫ ∞
−∞
exp−(x− µ)
2
2σ2
dµ = 1, (4.6)
For the SA− SD(0) approach, the limits ql and qu is given as,
ql =
(
iA − 1 + i− 1
n
)
pi
Q
− pi
2
, (4.7)
qu =
(
iA − 1 + i
n
)
pi
Q
− pi
2
= ql +
1
n
pi
Q
. (4.8)
For the SA− SD(1) approach, the limits ql and qu is given as,
ql =
(
iA − 1 + i− 3
n
)
pi
Q
− pi
2
, (4.9)
qu =
(
iA − 1 + i
n
)
pi
Q
− pi
2
= ql +
3
n
pi
Q
. (4.10)
For the SA− SD(2) approach, the limits ql and qu is given as,
ql =
(
iA − 1 + i− 5
n
)
pi
Q
− pi
2
, (4.11)
qu =
(
iA − 1 + i
n
)
pi
Q
− pi
2
= ql +
5
n
pi
Q
. (4.12)
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While for SA− SD(d) approach, it is given as,
ql =
(
iA − 1 + i− (1 + 2d)
n
)
pi
Q
− pi
2
, (4.13)
qu =
(
iA − 1 + i
n
)
pi
Q
− pi
2
= ql +
(1 + 2d)
n
pi
Q
. (4.14)
4.1.6 Information Reconciliation Rates
In this section we apply low complexity error correction block described in Section 3.3.2
is applied to reconcile for the discrepancies in the output of the quantizer with feedback.
First, Alice and Bob store p-tuples of bits denoted by kA and kB from the quantizer
output in a buffer of length p. In this thesis, a BCH code with rate 513
1023
and length-1023
bit codewords has been applied only for demonstrative purpose. Using the applied block
code, Alice and Bob, estimates and exchanges their respective syndromes via a public
feedback channel. Using the received syndromes the reconciled for the errors in their key
sequence.
An IRR of 100% is achieved at SNRs of 14.6 dB, 15.5 dB and 18 dB for SA− SD(0),
SA − SD(1) and SA − SD(2) respectively using a quantizer with Q = 4 and l = 4 as
shown in Figs. 4.51- 4.53. The information distillation rate (IDR) is for the
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Figure 4.51: Information reconciliation rate (IRR) in the SA− SD(0) approach.
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Furthermore, in Fig. 4.52 the IRR is depicted for the SA− SD(1) approach. IRR of
100% is achieved at SNRs as low as 11 dB and 15 dB for Q = 2 and Q = 4, respectively.
For SA − SD(2) this is achieved at a SNR 12.8 dB and 16.6 dB for Q = 2 and Q = 4,
respectively.
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Re
co
nc
ilia
tio
n 
Ra
te
 (IR
R)
SNR(dB)
 
 
Q=2,  n=8
Q=4,  n=8
Q=8,  n=8
Q=16,n=8
Q=2,  n=4
Q=4,  n=4
Q=8,  n=4
Q=16, n=4
Figure 4.52: Information reconciliation rate (IRR) in the SA− SD(1) approach.
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Figure 4.53: Information reconciliation rate (IRR) in the SA− SD(2) approach.
For the SA−SD(2) the overall high key generation rate makes it suitable for practical
applications. Each output block from the FEC block code of length, 2n − 1 ,is padded
with an extra bit unknown to Eve. The added bit is derived from the parity of the output
of the block code. From the preceding example, the output of the BCH decoder of length-
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1023 bits codewords is padded with an extra bit to form a block of 1024-bit reconciled
keys.
4.1.7 FEC Code Rates
In Chapter 3, we established an analytically analysis on the required block length needed
to achieve a target fractional rate of the channel capacity. In this section we analyse by
simulation the required encoder/decoder rate of the FEC to achieve a target IRR. We have
not been able to perform an analytical analysis on the needed decoder code rate k
n
required
to meet a target IRR and IDR. It is desired that the encoder/decoder rate k
n
be high as
possible, this is so because it has a direct effect on the amount of partial information
revealed to the adversary. For example, at a code rate of unity no bit of information is
revealed to the adversary during the error reconciliation. This also has a direct implication
on the IDR, since information bit which are partially revealed to the adversary are hashed
out during the privacy amplification phase. Thus higher code rate k
n
will lead to higher
IDR. This suggest that we should have a system, where in the encoder/decoder code rate
for the FEC is adaptive with the properties of the system at that point in time. As an
example, if the goal is to meet a target IRR of 90%, the system should be able to adjust
its code rate depending on the operating SNR for a given block error. Thus when the
SNR is very low, the system should be able to adjust its code rate based on current SNR
so as to adjust the error correcting capability of the FEC code used in order to achieve
the target IRR. As the SNR increase, the system will increase the code rate k
n
, increasing
the IDR while maintaining the target IRR. We have not been able to design an algorithm
that perform this adaptively, but will be demonstrating manually the required code rate
k
n
required to achieve a desire IRR. Let assume we desire to achieve 90 % IRR regardless
of the system variance and SNR. Simulation results shows the corresponding code rate
needed. Figs.4.54-4.57 shows the required code rate need to achieve a target IRR of
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90% for a BCH decoder. In this simulations the SA− SD(2) quantization approach was
used. We used a BCH(n,k,t) decoder for the FEC code. The size of the codeword n
is 1023-bits. The message length k and its corresponding error correcting capabilities
are set as an adaptive parameter. We have restricted the message length to around half
of the codeword length for simplicity. We carried simulations for quantization intervals
realizations Q = 2 . . . 16 for SNR = 5, 10, . . . , 20. At Q = 2, the highest k
n
required
to achieve the target IRR at SNRs 5, 10, 15 and 20 dB is 0.0308, 0.3206, 0.6 and 0.6
receptively. At Q = 4, the system could not meet the target IRR at all possible k
n
for
an SNR of 5 dB. The highest possible code rates required to achieve the target IRR at
operating SNRs of 10, 15 and 20 dB is 0.075, 0.442 and 0.6 respectively as shown in figure.
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Figure 4.54: Required k
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to achieve a target IRR for Q = 2.
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Figure 4.55: Required k
n
to achieve a target IRR for Q = 4.
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Figure 4.56: Required k
n
to achieve a target IRR for Q = 8.
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Figure 4.57: Required k
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to achieve a target IRR for Q = 16.
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4.2 Physical Layer Authenticated Encryption
Assuming that the key generation protocol is publicly available and that Eve is an active
eavesdropper, the threat model is summarized as follows:
- Eve can intercept all information exchanges between Alice and Bob, i.e., Eve can mount
chosen plaintext attacks.
- Eve can modify the transmitted signals in a predetermined manner, i.e., Eve can mount
chosen ciphertext attacks and can act as a man-in-the-middle.
Existing literature on shared randomness exclusively focuses on key generation for
data confidentiality applications in the presence of passive adversaries. On the other hand,
secure communication in the presence of an active adversary without any pre-shared secret
(i.e., a pre-established key at both Alice and Bob) is currently solely based on the use
of public key encryption schemes (PKE) [61] that employ trapdoor functions such as the
RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) or the DH (Diffie Hellman) with asymmetric key lengths of
at least 1024 or 2048 bits. However, the computational resources required to encrypt and
decrypt using PKE are substantial; as a result, PKE can limit the performance of ad-hoc
or device-to-device networks in which the nodes join or leave the network frequently.
To overcome such limitations, in this section we alternatively propose a physical layer
authenticated encryption (PLAE) scheme that instead of computationally demanding
trapdoor functions employs the low complexity scheme described in Section 3.3.1 to gen-
erate pair-wise keys. To begin with, we assume that Alice wishes to transmit a secret
message m to Bob without having access to a public key infrastructure. We build a PLAE
protocol using the following elements:
1) A physical layer key seed generation scheme employing the simple quantizer without
feedback described in section 3.3.1. The scheme will in the following be denoted by
FGen(hA, hB) = {sA, sB, eA, eB, kA, kB}.
2) A semantically secure hash function (random oracle) denoted by H(x) = k where
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k = {ke, ki} is a pair of keys. ke is to be employed by a symmetric encryption algorithm
and ki is the key to be used by a message authentication code (MAC).
3) A semantically secure authenticated encryption (A.E.) scheme (e.g. an encrypt-then-
MAC protocol) [61] that comprises four algorithms: an encryption algorithm denoted
by Es(ke,m) = c, a decryption algorithm denoted by Ds(ke, c) = m, a signing algorithm
denoted by S(ki,m) = t and a verification algorithm denoted by V (ki,m, t) = v ∈ {m,⊥}.
4.2.1 Two Node PLAE Protocol
- FGen scheme: During cycle 1 Alice transmits a probe signal to Bob who evaluates
sB(1), eB(1), kB(1). Subsequently, Bob transmits a probe signal to Alice who evaluates
sA(1), eA(1), kA(1). This procedure is repeated until suitable length tuples sA, eA, kA, sB, eB, kB
are generated from the concatenation of successively generated parameters, i.e., sA =
[sA(1)||, . . . , ||sA(n)], eA = [eA(1)||, . . . , ||eA(n)], kA = [kA(1)||, . . . , ||kA(n)], sB = [sB(1)||, . . . , ||sB(n)],
eB = [eB(1)||, . . . , ||eB(n)] and kB = [kB(1)||, . . . , ||kB(n)] where || denotes concatenation.
The number of cycles depends on the required key entropy according to the specifications
of the A.E. algorithms.
- Hashing and A.E.: Alice generates a secret key k = {ke, ki} = H(kA) and encrypts
the message as c = Es(ke,m). Subsequently, she signs the ciphertext c using the signing
algorithm t = S(ki, c) and transmits to Bob the extended ciphertext C = [sA||c||t]. We
note that although Alice’s syndrome is sent in the clear the scheme achieves semantic
security as will be discussed in the following.
- Integrity check and decryption: Bob checks the integrity of the received data as
follows: from sA he evaluates kA and obtains k = {ke, ki} = H(kA). Subsequently, Bob
evaluates V (ki, c, t), which is either equal to ⊥ if the integrity test of the A.E. failed or c
if the integrity test of the A.E. was successful. The integrity test will fail if any part of
C was modified; for example, if sA was modified during the transmission then Bob would
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have evaluated a wrong key k and the integrity test would have failed. If the integrity test
was successful then Bob decrypts m = Ds(ke, c). Using standard chosen ciphertext attack
and chosen plaintext attack semantic security proofs, it is straightforward to demonstrate
that the proposed scheme achieves semantic security and integrity.
4.2.2 Multi-node Key Generation Scheme
Generalizing the PLAE protocol to a wireless network with multiple nodes can have many
different flavors depending on the application of the FGen function. In this paper we briefly
present a scheme suitable for a network of N nodes who want to establish a common key
k. We note that generating a common secret key using the RSA or the DH schemes is an
open problem for networks with N > 3.
The procedure comprises two phases. In the first phase, the FGen scheme is applied
pairwise between node 1 and the remaining nodes 2 to N . In this phase, the nodes
sequentially transmit suitable probe signals one after the other and obtain estimates
of the pairwise CSIs h1,i and hi,1, i = 2, . . . , N . At the end of this procedure node 1
generates N − 1 pairwise syndromes s1,i, i = 2, . . . , N while the remaining nodes generate
syndromes s2, . . . , sN . The syndromes s1,i correspond to the error pattern from the key
seed k1 extracted from h1,2 to key seeds extracted from h1,i, i = 3, . . . , N . Finally the
syndromes si, i = 2, . . . , N correspond to error patterns of key seeds k2, . . . , kN , extracted
from hi,1, i = 2, . . . , N . At the second phase, node 1 generates a key k = H(k1) and
broadcasts its extended syndrome s1 = [s1,1||, . . . ||s1,N ] though an authenticated channel
as C1 = [s1||t1] where t1 = S(k, s1). From s1 nodes 2 to N can regenerate the common
secret key k using k = ki ⊕ ei ⊕ e1,i, for i = 2, . . . , N .
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4.3 Validation of the Key Generation Protocol Through
the NIST Test
An important property of secret keys for cryptographic applications is that they must
be uniformly distributed in the key space (this attribute is commonly referred to as
”being random” in the cryptographic community). In the following we will abide by
this convention). Given that Eve possesses detailed knowledge of our algorithm, any
non-randomness in the generated sequence can be exploited to break the key with low
time complexity. In order to ascertain the randomness of the generated key sequence, we
employ the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) statistical test suite to
verify the randomness of key sequence. A detailed description of the NIST statistical test
is described.
First, Alice and Bob process 6, 000, 000 channel phase samples derived from a wireless
fading channel at an operating SNR of 35 dB into 28, 158, 075 bits keys using quantizer
settings as detailed from Chapter 3 and (4.3). Discrepancies in their keys are reconciled
using a BCH code as described in section 3.3.2 with an error correcting capability of
57. Hashing the reconciled key sequence with SHA-256 produces a sequence of about
14, 000, 000 bits. Finally the NIST suite is invoked with a 10 key streams each of length
1, 000, 000 bits. The NIST test is a collection of statistical tests focused on a various types
of non-randomness likely to exist in any sequence.
The frequency test is concerned with determining whether the number of ones and
zeros are approximately the same just as it is in a purely random sequence. The frequency
test can be performed as a monobit or block-wise test. In the former the test is carried out
on the whole secret key sequence aiming to determine if the frequency of ones approximates
to 1/2, while in the latter the test is perform on M-bit blocks with the aim of determining
if the frequency of ones is close to M/2. It is important to note that all other NIST
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statistical tests depend on passing this test. The runs test investigates the number of runs
of zeros and ones of various lengths expected from the key sequence, thus determining
the oscillation speed between ones and zeros. A run is length of identical bits bounded
before and after by opposite bits.
Longest runs of ones in a block is a test designed to determine if the length of the
longest runs of ones within a key sequence is consistent with that of a purely random key
sequence. The Binary matrix rank test looks searches for linear dependence among fixed
length sub-strings of the key sequence, while the discrete Fourier transform test searches
for repetitive patterns which are close to each other in the key sequence under test,
thus indicating a deviation from randomness. The purpose of the overlapping template
matching test is to identify the number of occurrences of certain pre-defined bit strings.
Unlike the overlapping test, the non-overlapping template match test identifies generators
which produce too many occurrences of a given non-periodic pattern. Both test requires
a slide window of size r bits to search for a given r bit pattern. Maurer’s universal
statistical test on a key sequence investigate whether the sequence can be compressed
without loss of information. A key sequence which is compressible is considered non-
random. An important feature of a random sequence is that it can be characterised by
long linear feedback shift registers (LFSR). The linear complexity test is one which aim
at determining whether or not a key sequence is complex enough to be regarded as a
random stream.
In a random sequence the probability having 2r r-bits overlapping patterns in the
sequence is roughly the same. This implies that every r-bits pattern has equal likelihood
of occurring. To this end, the serial test is designed to determine the rate of occurrence
of all possible overlapping r-bits patterns across the whole key sequence. Unlike serial
test, the approximate entropy tests compares the frequency of overlapping blocks of two
adjacent block lengths, w and w+ 1, with that of a random sequence. Lastly, we consider
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Table 4.1: NIST statistical randomness test result for a 1e7 bits stream, for SA−SD(2),
SNR = 30 dB)
TEST P-Value
Monobit Frequency 0.739918
Block Frequency 0.739918
Cumulative Sums 0.534146
Runs 0.739918
Longest Run 0.350485
Binary Matrix Rank 0.213309
FFT 0.911413
Non-overlapping Template 0.911413
Overlapping Template 0.534146
Maurer’s UniversaL Test 0.122325
Approximate Entropy 0.739918
Serial 0.739918
Linear Complexity 0.122325
a cumulative sum test to determine whether the cumulative sum of the partial sequence
found in the key is too large compared to that expected from a random key sequences
which is near zero.
The tests described above were used to compute the P-values which describes the
probability that a purely random number generator would have generated a key sequence
which is less random than the secret key under statistical test. A sequence with a P-value
of 1 is considered a purely random sequence. A key sequence whose P-value > 0.001 is
considered random with a confidence of 99.99%. Tab.4.1 summarizes the statistical test
result our generated secret keys. The P-values obtained in each test indicates that the
key sequence generated by our algorithm is random.
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5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have studied physical layer security which is founded on the principles
of information theory. The main objective of physical layer security is to exploit and take
advantage of the inherent randomness property of wireless communication channels in
order to strengthen the security of communication systems. In this thesis, we have stud-
ied some aspects of physical layer security, with emphasis on the channel characteristic,
achievable key rate, quantization and authentication techniques.
In Chapter 3 we extended earlier physical layer key generation approaches by proposing
a novel key extraction scheme with the novelty of using the phase of the channel estimates
as the channel state information parameter in the information distillation phase. First
we performed a statistical characterization of the channel with which we will perform
an adaptive quantization for key distillation. We carried out an analytic analysis to
determine the achievable key rate. Given these results we were able to determine the
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minimum encoder block-length required to achieved a desired rate as a function of the
error rate  and SNR. We proposed our multi-level adaptive quantization scheme for the
distillation of keys. Two quantization technique was proposed in this Chapter namely;
quantizer using gaurdbands and quantizer using bit redundancy. In order to improve the
performance of the key generation process, that is the IRR and the IDR, a low complexity
information reconciliation approach built using standard linear block codes is proposed.
In Chapter 4, an improved and novel quantization approach with public feedback which
allow for a substantial reduction in the complexity of the information reconciliation phase
is proposed. Furthermore, using a simple version of the proposed key generation scheme
we developed a novel physical layer authenticated encryption (PLAE) scheme, employing
standard semantically secure algorithms. The proposed PLAE scheme offers a compelling
alternative to computationally demanding PKE schemes and can be employed in the
set-up of secure sessions in wireless networks. Due to its low computational complexity
it can be particularly attractive in resource limited networks (e.g. sensor networks) or
dynamic settings (e.g. ad hoc and device-to-device networks). Finally, our key generation
algorithm and quantizer are tested for soundness using the NIST statistical test suite.
The purpose of this test is to verify the randomness of the generated key sequence by our
algorithm. Results from this chapter shows that the P-values obtain in all the statistical
test carried out indicates that the key sequence generated by our algorithm is indeed
random, thus fit for cryptographic purposes.
5.2 Future Research
In this thesis we have extended the basics of the wiretap channel to design an improved
key generation algorithm at the physical layer which could be used to refreshed key at
the upper which where cryptographic securities are implement. The results presented
in this thesis can be extended in the following interesting directions. A major weakness
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identified with our proposed key generation scheme is associated with the PLEA phase.
The authentication scheme does not work well with the use of feedback in the presence of
an active attacker. Future research work can be steered towards designing a secure and
strong authentication scheme for the multi-level feedback quantizer.
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Glossary of Terms
Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN)
Basic noise model used in Information theory to
mimic the effect of many random processes that occur
in nature.
Authenticated encryption (A.E.) A block cipher mode of operation which simultane-
ously provides confidentiality, integrity, and authen-
ticity assurances on the data; decryption is combined
in single step with integrity verification.
Bose Chaudhuri and Hoc-
quenghem (BCH)
BCH codes form a large class of powerful random
error-correcting cyclic codes. This class of codes is a
remarkable generalization of the Hamming code for
multiple-error correction.
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Bit Generation Rate (BGR) Rate in bit per second of generating secret bits.
Bit Matching Rate (BMR) Rate at which two or more key bit match.
Channel State Information(CSI) A measurement of the channel property of a channel
both in phase and magnitude.
Certificate Authority (CA) Issuer of the Digital Certificate. Also validates the
Identity of the End-Entity that posseses the Digital
Certificate.
Diffie Hellman (D-H) An algorithm used to establish a shared secret be-
tween two parties. It is primarily used as a method
of exchanging cryptography keys for use in symmetric
encryption algorithms like AES.
Forward Error Correction (FEC) A technique used for controlling errors in data trans-
mission over unreliable or noisy communication chan-
nels.
Guard Band Indicator (GBI) A bit sent when a channel sample falls within the re-
gion of a predefined interval. Most times those chan-
nel samples are discarded.
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Initialization Vector (IV) An initialization vector (IV) is an arbitrary number
that can be used along with a secret key for data
encryption. This number, also called a nonce, is em-
ployed only one time in any session.
Information Reconciliation Rate
(IRR)
Rate and probability of generating identical crypto-
graphic keys by nodes independently.
Information Distillation Rates
(IDR)
Rate of generating identical keys in bit per second.
Independent and Identically Dis-
tributed (IID)
In probability theory and statistics, a sequence or
other collection of random variables is independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) if each random
variable has the same probability distribution as the
others and all are mutually independent.
Message Authentication Code
(MAC)
MAC is a piece of information used to authenticate a
messagein other words, to confirm that the message
came from the stated sender (its authenticity) and
has not been changed in transit (its integrity).
Mobile Adhoc Networks
(MANETs)
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a continuously
self-configuring, infrastructure-less network of mobile
devices connected without wires.
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Multiple Input Multiple output
(MIMO)
MIMO (multiple input, multiple output) is an an-
tenna technology for wireless communications in
which multiple antennas are used at both the source
(transmitter) and the destination (receiver). The an-
tennas at each end of the communications circuit
are combined to minimize errors and optimize data
speed. MIMO is one of several forms of smart an-
tenna technology, the others being MISO (multiple
input, single output) and SIMO (single input, multi-
ple output).
Least Significant Bit (LSB) LSB is the bit position in a binary integer giving the
units value, that is, determining whether the number
is even or odd.
One Time Pad (OTP) Also called Vernam-cipher or the perfect cipher, is a
crypto algorithm where plaintext is combined with a
random key. It is the only existing mathematically
unbreakable encryption.
Orthogonal Frequency Division
multiplexing (OFDM)
OFDM is a frequency-division multiplexing (FDM)
scheme used as a digital multi-carrier modulation
method. A large number of closely spaced orthogonal
sub-carrier signals are used to carry data on several
parallel data streams or channels.
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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI ) A PKI enables users of a basically unsecured public
network such as the Internet to securely and privately
exchange data and money through the use of a public
and a private cryptographic key pair that is obtained
and shared through a trusted authority. The pub-
lic key infrastructure provides for a digital certificate
that can identify an individual or an organization and
directory services that can store and, when necessary,
revoke the certificates.
Physical Layer Security (PLS) A technique of achieving security in communication
system by exploiting the properties of the system.
Received Signal Strength(RSS) A measurement of the power present in a received
radio signal.
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) RSA a fundamental encryption algorithms developed
in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman. The RSA algorithm is the most commonly
used encryption and authentication algorithm and is
included as part of the Web browsers from Netscape
and Microsoft.
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) A measure used in science and engineering that com-
pares the level of a desired signal to the level of back-
ground noise.
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Slot Agreement Slot Disagree-
ment (SA SD)
Proposed algorithm for determine the agreement and
generation of secret keys based on the observed slot.
Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN)
A wireless LAN (or WLAN, for wireless local area
network, sometimes referred to as LAWN, for local
area wireless network) is one in which a mobile user
can connect to a local area network (LAN) through
a wireless (radio) connection.
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